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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to determine which variables help identify firms 
that have reduced or eliminated postretirement benefits other than pensions (OPEBs). 
Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) found that the adoption of SFAS No. 106 was one of the major 
determinants in OPEB reduction decisions. Those authors also found that financial 
weakness was a determinant in such reductions. This study attempts to determine the 
possible factors involved in such decisions, including both financial weakness and the 
OPEB liability, now that its disclosure is mandated by SFAS No. 106.
The theoretical backbone of this study was traced back to the work of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), who discovered that firms generally restrict dividends 
or take other steps to maintain financial slack. Stone (1987), Mittelstaedt (1989), and 
Thomas (1989) found financial weakness to be a determinant in pension plan reduction 
decisions.
Two-group discriminant analysis was used since the dependent variable was 
categorical while the independent variables were continuous. Sample firms fell into two 
groups: 1. No-change firms (firms that did not reduce or eliminate OPEBs), 2. Change 
firms (firms that did reduce or eliminate OPEBs). Financial weakness variables and OPEB 
liability variables were used in the model. Six hypotheses were tested.
iii
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The full sample consisted of 588 firms, but the very small proportion of change 
firms to no-change firms confounded the results. A reduced and more balanced sample was 
used in the final analysis. The final model had a classificatory accuracy of about 75 percent.
These results indicate that the relationship between financial weakness and OPEB 
plan reductions may have changed since the adoption of SFAS No. 106 and that this 
relationship is considerably weaker than that found in prior research. This study’s findings 
also provide little evidence that there is a long-term negative effect associated with the 
OPEB liability.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the issuance of SFAS No. 106, postretirement employee benefits other 
than pensions (OPEBs) generally were accounted for by employers on a "pay-as-you-go" 
(i.e., cash) basis, despite contractual promises to provide future benefits for current 
service.1 The disclosure of the liability from this type of deferred compensation was not 
required under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).2 As premiums or claims 
were paid, companies simply recorded them and disclosed these amounts as the expense. 
These benefits had long been treated as if they were immaterial; but with the rising cost of 
health care, an increasing number of retirees, and greater life expectancy among retirees, 
this was increasingly being viewed by critics of accounting as nondisclosure of relevant 
financial statement information concerning future cash flows. The need to rectify this 
situation was formally acknowledged by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
'"OPEBs" is the acronym for "other (than pensions) postretirement employee benefits." OPEBs 
is used in this study, and its use is consistent with nonpension retirement benefits literature.
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 81, Disclosure o f Postretirement Health Care 
and Life Insurance Benefits, only required disclosure of: (1) the benefits provided and the employee groups 
covered, (2) the employer's current accounting and funding policies for those benefits, and (3) the cost of 
those benefits recognized for the period (FASB 1984).
1
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2(FASB) as early as 1979 but it would take eleven years before SFAS No. 106 would make 
accrual accounting for OPEBs part of GAAP.
Some of the major concerns surrounding SFAS No. 106 were that its 
implementation would create a significant negative effect on companies' financial 
statements, cause negative market effects, and cause many companies to reduce or 
terminate nonpension postretirement plans (Grossman, Flory, and Phillips 1989), (Newell 
1989). As mentioned in the next section, there is evidence that there were negative 
financial statement and market effects, and evidence was found that suggests the adoption 
of this standard motivated many firms to reduce or terminate OPEBs.
Now that the OPEB liability is being recorded, as mandated by SFAS No. 106, can 
the level of this liability help predict whether firms will reduce or terminate such plans, 
now that we are in the post-SFAS 106 adoption period?
Definition of OPEBs 
Nonpension postretirement employee benefits include, but are not limited to, life 
insurance provided outside a pension plan to retirees; postretirement health care; and other 
so-called “welfare” benefits such as day care, legal services, and housing subsidies. SFAS 
No. 106 is applicable to aH postretirement benefits (other than pensions) expected to be 
provided by the employer to current and former employees.
Health care benefits are becoming increasingly significant in terms of cost and 
recurrence, and the rapid increase in the costs of these benefits has helped fuel the push 
to accrue postretirement benefits’ costs.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3Health care benefits first were provided to employees as compensation for the 
effects of price and wage freezes during World War II (Van Remortel 1988). With the 
introduction of Medicare in 1965, the government began paying a significant portion of 
retirees' health care costs. Companies increased promised retiree health care benefits. They 
promised to provide retiree health care benefits that would cover the small gap between 
actual costs and what Medicare covered (Van Remortel 1988). This resulted in a rapid 
increase in employer-provided health care insurance benefits for retirees. Companies 
increasingly used such benefits to attract and keep employees. By 1988, health care 
benefits were being provided to retirees by 82 percent of U.S. companies with 1,000 or 
more employees, and by 91 percent of the companies with more than 5,000 employees 
(Light, Treece, and Driscoll 1991; Amir, 1993). This alone had made OPEBs an 
increasingly important accounting issue.
Fundam ental Issue 
A substantial amount of pension research has been conducted in recent years. For 
example, Stone (1987), Mittelstaedt (1989), and Thomas (1989) examined determinants 
of pension plan reductions and terminations. There were many more pension-related 
studies conducted during this time but they are not directly related to this study. Despite 
the large number of pension studies, OPEB research was extremely limited until the advent 
of SFAS No. 106. As will be mentioned in greater detail later, OPEBs were originally 
considered immaterial in their cost, which was probably the main reason for the lack of 
interest in studying the subject.
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4In 1979, when the first Exposure Draft on postretirement benefits was issued, it 
signaled the FASB's concerns about such costs. Were they material and should they be 
accrued? In 1989, when the Exposure Draft that would become SFAS No. 106 was issued, 
it created immediate interest in OPEBs because the proposal mandated the accrual of a 
liability for postretirement benefits. Firms had been treating these costs as immaterial so 
one of the first research questions was to determine whether, since these firms had 
previously understated both liabilities and expenses, there would be any negative effects 
on such firms' securities in the financial markets once these costs were recorded properly.
In the early 1990s, a number of studies examined stock market effects due to the 
creation of, for many firms, a large unfunded liability along with a transition obligation, 
which would either be expensed or amortized over a period of 20 years. This will be 
explained in greater detail later. Major studies included those by Espahbodi, Strock, and 
Tehranian (1991), Amir (1993), Mittelstaedt and Warshawsky (1993), and Young (1993). 
In 1994, Smith examined the relationship of financial strength to early adoption of SFAS 
No. 106. Amir and Livnat (1996) and Amir (1997) also examined firms' timing of the 
adoption of SFAS No. 106.
In 1995, the issue of OPEB reductions was examined by Mittelstaedt, Nichols, and 
Regier (1995), who tested the hypothesis that the adoption of SFAS No. 106 was a major 
factor in such reductions. They found a significant statistical relationship between the 
adoption of SFAS No. 106 and OPEB reductions. However, the adoption of the standard 
was not the only factor in OPEB reductions. Financial weakness also appeared to be a 
significant factor according to the study. This research will be covered later in this paper.
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5The next logical step in OPEB research is to identify the determinants of reductions 
in these benefits, now that the direct and immediate effects of SFAS No. 106 adoption are 
past. Unlike pension research, OPEB research did not focus on plan reductions or 
terminations prior to the existence of SFAS No. 106. It appears that all such research has 
included the adoption of SFAS No. 106 as an independent variable in the analysis of these 
benefit reductions.
Also, in this study the SFAS No. 106 liability will be used as an independent 
variable in each of the years being examined. During the literature review, no studies were 
found that used this liability as an independent variable in an attempt to determine OPEB 
reduction decisions. The question is whether the changes in this liability correlate strongly 
with OPEB reductions. Recent research, such as Mittelstaedt et al. (1995), found evidence 
supporting the assertion that increased contracting costs caused by the adoption of SFAS 
No. 106, along with financial weakness independent of it were the primary determinants 
of such benefit reductions. To a lesser extent, firm-specific changes in retiree health care 
costs were found to influence benefit reduction decisions.
Now, with the SFAS No. 106 liability established, the relationships among the 
variables, which prior research found to have a statistically significant correlation with 
OPEB reductions, almost certainly have changed. It is possible that some of the variables, 
particularly the increased contracting cost variables, might be less significant, now that the 
adoption of SFAS No. 106 is no longer a variable. Other variables, particularly those 
relating to financial weakness, may be more significant. These relationships, as they apply
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6to OPEB reductions and terminations, apparently were not studied prior to the FASB's 
1989 Exposure Draft, which would become SFAS No. 106.
Studies examining pension plan reductions and terminations have found that 
financial weakness is a determinant in the liquidation of assets of overfunded pension plans 
and in the termination of overfunded plans (Stone 1987; Mittelstaedt 1989; Thomas 1989). 
Specifically, these studies have examined the determinants of firms’ decisions to contract 
or terminate overfunded pension plans. The studies found that both contractors (those who 
reduce benefits) and terminators were financially weak prior to the decision to take these 
actions. These findings are consistent with two hypotheses. First, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
suggested that financially weak firms liquidated financial slack when internally generated 
cash flows were insufficient and that these liquidations were done in an orderly fashion, 
using the least costly sources o f financing first. Secondly, Mittelstaedt and Reiger (1993) 
hypothesized that the value of upholding an implicit contract diminishes as a firm’s 
financial health deteriorates, suggesting that financially weak firms are expected to 
terminate plans. Also, the weakest firms generally eliminate defined benefit plans.
Although these findings alone might suggest that financial weakness would be a 
determinant in OPEB reductions, such a direct comparison is generally not applicable. Few 
OPEBs are funded, often making liquidation of fund assets unlikely. However, the fact that 
financial weakness was a major factor in pension fund liquidations suggests that it might 
be a significant factor in OPEB reduction decisions. Mittelstaedt, et al. (1995) found 
financial weakness to be a major factor along with the adoption of SFAS No. 106 in OPEB 
reduction decisions.
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7Objective of the Study
This study seeks to determine which variables help identify firms that have reduced 
or eliminated postretirement benefits other than pensions. Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) found 
that the adoption of SFAS No. 106 could be cited as one of the major contributing factors 
in the reduction and elimination of postretirement health benefits made by firms in the past 
several years. However, Mittelstaedt et al. found that the adoption of SFAS No. 106 was 
not the only determinant in such reductions. This study attempts to determine the possible 
factors involved in these decisions, including the OPEB liability itself, now that it is 
disclosed according to the requirements of SFAS No. 106. Since the period being studied 
includes only years in which this was in effect, the actual adoption of this statement is not 
used as a variable. No studies have been found that use the OPEB liability as an 
independent variable in attempting to identify determinants of benefit reductions or 
terminations. The OPEB research that has been conducted (e.g., Mittelstaedt et al.) has 
concentrated on the actual or anticipated adoption of SFAS No. 106 by firms as a factor 
contributing to the reduction of postretirement benefits.
The results of this study will be useful to practitioners, researchers, and the general 
public, as it will provide evidence regarding relationships between key independent 
variables and reductions or terminations of OPEBs (the dependent variable). This study 
may help determine the need and direction of future research in this area. It is intended to 
fill a gap in current OPEB research. Pension research has found that financial weakness 
is the most significant factor in explaining firms’ liquidation of excess plan assets. Prior
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8research suggests (e.g., Stone 1987) that firms tend to liquidate assets of overfunded 
pension plans when other forms of financing were unavailable.
Accounting for OPEBs Prior to SFAS No. 106
Prior to the adoption of SFAS No. 106, OPEBs were reported by employers on 
a "pay-as-you-go" (i.e., cash) basis, despite contractual promises to provide future benefits 
for current service. This was due to the fact that these costs were felt to be immaterial at 
one time (FASB 1981, f  2). However, this practice continued long after such costs became 
material (FASB 1981, f  3). The fact that these costs had become material persuaded the 
FASB to make changes in the way firms accounted for them.
W hv Change W as N eeded 
Since the benefits of current employees’ services are being received now, it is 
consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that the future 
expenditures on OPEBs be matched with the revenue currently being generated from the 
employees’ work. When amounts are immaterial, accrual accounting is unnecessary. This 
was the case for OPEBs at one point. However, the amounts spent on these benefits 
increased dramatically over time, and, by the late 1970s, were no longer considered 
immaterial by the FASB (FASB 1979, f  2). The upward trend in OPEB expenditures has 
continued, so accounting for them using the pay-as-you-go (cash) method would be even 
more likely to lead to material misstatements in the financial statements of companies 
offering these benefits.
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9The Long Joum ev o f  SFAS No. 106
1. Exposure Draft -  1979
2. Discussion Memorandum -  1981
3. Preliminary Reviews Document -  1982
4. Discussion Memorandum -  1983
5. Comments/Letters in Response to 1983 Discussion Memorandum
6. Exposure Draft -  1984
7. Responses to 1984 Exposure Draft
8. SFAS No. 81-1984
9. Technical Bulletin -  1987
10. Exposure Draft -  1989
11. SFAS No. 106 -  December, 1990
Purpose and Requirements o f  SFAS No. 106 
The main purpose of SFAS No. 106 was to increase the accuracy and usefulness 
of financial statements of those firms offering postretirement benefits other than pensions. 
SFAS No. 106 requires the accrual of the expected cost of nonpension postretirement 
benefits over the years the employee renders the service necessary to become eligible for 
them. The employer must recognize in its statement of financial position its obligation for 
OPEBs over the service life of its employees. This standard prohibits the practice of 
accounting for OPEBs on a cash basis.
SFAS No. 106 focused largely on retiree medical (health) benefits. These benefits 
generally comprise the largest part of postretirement benefits. The medical benefits also 
are the fastest growing in total dollars. Under SFAS No. 106, the present value of 
postretirement benefits should be accrued at the date an employee is fully eligible to 
receive them. The employer must measure two obligations in deferring these benefits: 
(1) the Expected Postretirement Benefit Obligation (EPBO), which is the actuarial present
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
value of postretirement benefits expected to be paid after retirement to the employees and 
their dependents, and (2) the Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligation (APBO), 
which is the actuarial present value of all future benefits based on employees' service 
rendered.
Firms offering OPEBs were required to adopt SFAS No. 106 for the fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 1992. However, for firms outside the United States and 
certain small, nonpublic employers, the application of the statement was delayed until fiscal 
years beginning after December 15, 1994 (FASB 1990, ^ 108).
Also, employers were allowed alternatives in recognizing the transition obligation, 
the amount ofthe unfunded and previously unrecognized postretirement benefit obligation. 
An employer could have either recognized the transition and the associated cost 
immediately or amortized it on a straight-line basis over the average remaining service 
period of active plan participants. However, if the average remaining service period was 
less than 20 years, the employer could have elected to use a 20-year period. Additionally, 
if all or almost all of the plan participants were inactive, the employer was required to use 
the average remaining life expectancy period of those plan participants (FASB 1990, 
1IH2).
Concerns Regarding Accounting 
Under SFAS No. 106
Market Reactions
SFAS No. 106 was a very controversial standard partially because of the perceived 
negative effects it would have on the financial statements of companies adopting it. In
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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addition, others thought that the negative effects on financial statements would translate 
into negative market effects for those adopting firms. Research such as that done by 
Espahbodi, et al. (1991) and Young (1993) did find a statistically significant market effect, 
giving evidence that these concerns were valid.
Benefit Reductions
Another related concern was that the negative financial statement and market 
effects would cause firms to reduce or eliminate other postretirement benefits. Evidence 
from the Espahbodi, et al. (1991) and Young (1993) studies as well as that provided by 
Smith (1994) supports the assertion that this was valid. Studies examining pension plan 
reductions such as Stone (1987), Mittelstaedt (1989), and Thomas (1989) give further 
evidence that this was a valid concern. Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) provides the strongest 
support for this assertion, as this study found a statistically significant relationship between 
the adoption of SFAS No. 106 and OPEB plan reductions.
Long-term Effects
There is concern that since companies now have to record an accrued liability for 
their OPEB obligations, companies will continue to reduce or terminate such plans at an 
accelerated rate. The Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) study provides evidence that these fears are 
well founded. There appears to be no research in this area to date, however, due partially 
to the fact that only a few years have passed since companies adopted SFAS No. 106, 
making sufficient data unavailable until now. Sufficient data now exist, allowing work to
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proceed in this area. As more data become available, further studies will likely be done, 
some ofwhich will incorporate methodologies not yet possible because of insufficient data.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Capital Structure Research 
Mvers and Mailuf U984)
Myers and Majluf examined corporate financing and investment decisions. The 
authors found that firms generally found it better to issue safe securities than risky ones. 
They also perceived that external financing employing debt is better than financing by 
equity. In addition, firms whose investment opportunities exceeded cash flows, and who 
had used up their ability to issue low-risk debt have sometimes decided to forego solid 
investments rather than issue risky securities to finance them. Additionally, the authors 
found that firms tended to build up financial slack by restricting dividends when investment 
requirements were modest.
This study appears to be the first to describe what Myers (1984) called a “pecking 
order” regarding financing decisions. Although the Myers inquiry did not include the study 
of pensions or postretirement benefits, future studies on these topics drew upon their 
findings.
13
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Mvers (1984)
Myers examined the question of how companies choose their capital structures. He 
came to the following conclusions:
First, firms have good reasons for avoiding issuing common stock and other risky 
securities to finance capital investments. They do not want to fall into the dilemma of 
either passing up positive-NPV projects3 or issuing stock at a price they perceive as too 
low. In addition, firms set target dividend payout ratios so that internally generated funds 
will be sufficient to cover normal capital expenditures. The author also found that firms 
also restrain themselves in the issuance of debt, so that these levels will remain at a level 
deemed safe, thus avoiding material costs associated with financial distress, while allowing 
the existence of financial slack in the form of reserve borrowing power.
Since investment opportunities fluctuate relative to internal cash flow, there are 
times when the firm exhausts its ability to issue safe debt. When this occurs, such a firm 
turns to the least risky securities first. Under such a “pecking order,” observed debt ratios 
reflect the cumulative requirement for external financing.
Myers concluded that the higher up the pecking order a firm goes, the greater the 
likelihood of incurring costs related to financial distress, thus increasing the likelihood that 
positive-NPV investments would be avoided. Accordingly, financial slack (in the form of 
borrowing power) can be regarded as valuable, and firms will take steps to acquire it. 
Myers has mentioned the issuance of stock as one way to acquire slack. He did not
3 NPV refers to net present value. Net present value projects are those that are expected to provide 
a rate of return on invested funds that exceeds the cost of the invested funds.
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mention pension plan asset liquidation as a source of financial slack but this possibility has 
been addressed in some of the pension related research. This will be reviewed in the next 
section.
Pension Research 
Stone (1987)
Drawing upon the analytical framework of Myers and Majluf (1984), Stone 
addressed the question of whether overfunded pension plan terminations could be 
explained as financing decisions. At the time of her study, the tax laws encouraged 
overfunding, and there were few legal restrictions on plan terminations. In fact, there were 
no tax penalties on them during the period studied (1982-1984).
In her study, Stone examined 214 firms, and using multivariate statistical analysis, 
found the model to be significant at the .001 level. The design had a classificatory accuracy 
of 81.25 percent, suggesting that pension plan terminations were, at least to a large extent, 
financing decisions.
These findings support the assertion that management has the flexibility of 
accumulating financial slack in the form of pension fund assets, and that this restraint is 
more likely to be drawn upon when (1) the firm generates a smaller proportion of its 
resources internally, (2) the market assigns a lower value to its cash flows, and (3) the firm 
has incentives to avoid additional debt financing. The results are consistent with a 
financing explanation for overfunded plan terminations.
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Mittelstaedt (1989*1
Mittelstaedt attempted to explain firms’ decisions to reduce overfunding of defined
benefit pension plans, either quickly through legal terminations or more slowly through
actuarial adjustments. He hypothesized that:
Both terminators and contractors experience financial weakness prior to reducing 
pension funding. Terminators experience greater financial weakening than 
contractors.
His premise was based upon the above mentioned studies by Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984), which found evidence suggesting that when a firm’s cash needs exceed 
those generated from operations, the firm follows a “pecking order” in choosing the means 
of financing.
Mittelstaedt’s final sample consisted of 52 terminator firms, 47 contractor firms, 
and 59 maintainers. Using univariate analysis, he found evidence that terminators were 
significantly weaker financially than maintainers and that terminators were financially 
weaker three years prior to termination. Terminators were also found to be more 
susceptible to takeover, and terminators exhibited declines in marginal tax rates 
(suggesting a significant decrease in earnings or increased losses). Contractors were also 
financially weaker than maintainers three years prior to plan reductions. These contractors 
were also significantly more likely to have declines in marginal tax rates than maintainers. 
As expected, values for contractors fell between those for terminators and maintainers.
Logit model analysis results were consistent with those he found by univariate 
analysis. Overall, the evidence suggested that contractor and terminator firms were 
financially weaker than maintainers. In addition, the marginal tax rate variable indicated
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that contractors and terminators were more likely to have declines in marginal tax rates 
prior to contractions or terminations.
Mittelstaedt’s results provide evidence that firms reduce pension assets to meet 
cash needs after experiencing capital constraints. Based upon Mittelstaedt’s study as well 
as prior ones, it does appear that when cash requirements are high and firms experience 
severe financial weakening, they are much more likely to terminate plans. But when cash 
needs and financial weakening are less serious, they are more likely to reduce their plans.
Thomas (1989)
Thomas also sought to understand why firms terminate overfunded pension plans. 
He discussed three alternative explanations. First, excess pension plan assets represent a 
source of financial slack and are withdrawn by firms facing an unexpected decline in 
available funds. Second, reversions expropriate wealth from workers since firms renege 
on an implicit promise to pay pension benefits that vest later in a worker’s career. Third, 
for firms anticipating financial distress, asset reversions allow wealth transfers to 
stockholders from lenders and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
Based upon the work of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), Thomas 
developed a financial slack hypothesis. He predicted that both slow withdrawals and plan 
terminations would follow unexpected declines in funds from operations and/or increases 
in profitable investment opportunities.
Thomas obtained a sample of 611 plans, which represented 514 completed 
terminations and 97 proposed terminations. Thomas found evidence that terminating firms
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fell into three general groups: (1) terminations unassociated with control changes,
(2) terminations followed by hostile attempts to change control, and (3) terminations 
following friendly control changes.
The financial slack explanation appeared to be the most likely rationale for all 
terminations (with and without control changes). Excess pension assets represent financial 
slack, and slow withdrawals and terminations represent liquidation of such slack. 
Continued declines in available funds that exhaust the stock of preferred sources of slack 
were found to be associated with terminations.
OPEB Research 
Askren (1991)
Askren sought to estimate the unobservable OPEBs obligation for a sample of 100 
firms for the years 1987,1988, and 1989. This obligation is considered unobservable, since 
the market values of assets and liabilities are unobservable and because book values are 
recorded at historical cost rather than at market value. The author developed three models: 
one attempted to identify the components ofthe market value of assets (MVA), one tried 
to identify the elements that define the market value of liabilities (MVL), and one that 
endeavored to identify the variables closely associated with the level of the OPEBs 
obligation. The OPEBs obligation is one of the components of MVL.
Askren hypothesized that an increase in the OPEBs obligation would, in turn, 
increase the market's assessment of the liabilities of the firm, as the OPEBs obligation 
represents off-balance sheet debt and should have a direct effect on the market value of
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the firm's liabilities. Through the use of a two-stage least squares regression, Askren 
determined that, as expected, the OPEBs obligation was positively and significantly 
associated with the market value of liabilities for all three years of her study. These results 
were consistent with the market's assessment of the OPEBs obligation as a financial 
responsibility of the firm, despite its absence from the balance sheet.
Askren also found that the OPEBs obligation coefficients increased during the 
period examined, which she suggested might have been caused by the increased awareness 
of them. During 1988, the press reported the FASB proposal to accrue other 
postemployment benefits. This drew attention to the extremely large potential liability 
firms had accumulated but had left unrecorded. Askren felt that if this unrecorded liability 
was incorporated into stock prices, it could explain the increased size of the OPEBs 
coefficient.
Espahbodi. Strock. and 
Tehranian (1991)
This paper examined the impact of nine pronouncements on equity prices as they 
related to the (then) proposed SFAS No. 106. The theories used by the authors in 
formulating their hypotheses were presented by Watts and Zimmerman (1986): (1) the 
contracting cost hypothesis, which maintains that stock prices may decline as a proposed 
accounting standard increases the probability that debt covenants will be violated and thus 
increases the anticipated cost of a technical default and (2) the political cost hypothesis. 
which asserts that the announcement of such an accounting change might result in stock 
price increases, especially for larger firms, due to the reduction of political costs. Based
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upon previous studies, [e.g., Collins, Rozeff, and Dhaliwal (1981) and Lys (1984)], 
Espahbodi et al., expected a positive impact from the reduction of political costs which 
would be outweighed, on average, by the negative effect of increased contracting costs.
A total of 143 firms were examined. Using Pearson correlation, the authors found 
support for the suggestion that the pre-SFAS No. 106 accounting procedure was related 
to firm size, a point consistent with the assertion that large firms use income-reducing 
alternatives [Watts and Zimmerman (1986)]. They also found support for the claim that 
the proposal to force accrual of OPEBs obligations would have a significant impact on 
firm's financial statements. Furthermore, they suggested a negative stock price impact with 
the issuance of the Exposure Draft, which would be more significant for firms with high 
debt-ratios. These findings support their contracting cost hypothesis.
Amir (1993)
Amir analyzed the valuation implications of firms' OPEBs obligations. The study 
examined investors' assessments of disclosed postretirement benefit (PRB) cash payments 
prior to SFAS No. 106. He also inquired as to whether a measure of the PRB obligation4 
is regarded as value-relevant by investors in addition to the disclosed cash payments.
Amir used 1990 COMPUSTAT data for the period of 1984-1990. Sample sizes 
ranged from 243 in 1984 to 313 in 1990. This study used a valuation model that relates 
the value of a firm to the information provided in its income statement and balance sheet. 
Amir adopted the model derived by Ohlson (1991) that relates equity value to both
4 PRB obligation is synonymous with OPEB obligation.
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accounting earnings and book value of equity. This analysis was conducted in two stages. 
First, a measure of the PRB liability was examined to see if it was value-relevant. This was 
done in addition to cash payments information. Second, accounting numbers were adjusted 
so that earnings and book values included the estimated present values of the PRB 
obligation. The cash information was examined to see if it was value-relevant to investors 
in addition to extant liability information.
Amir's results indicate that, over the period of 1987-1990, there was a change in 
investors' assessment of the PRB obligation. His observation is consistent with that of 
Askiren (1991) who found a similar change in the OPEBs coefficient.
The results from this study suggest that investors had changed their assessment of 
the PRB obligation over the period of 1984-1990 from a position of underestimation 
during 1984-1986 to realization of the large size of the present value of the expected PRB 
liability during 1987-1990. The PRB obligation was found to be value-relevant to investors 
in addition to the cash payments which were found not to be value-relevant when the 
accounting numbers were adjusted to reflect the estimated PRB obligation. His findings 
indicate that a measure of the PRB obligation based upon publicly available information 
prior to the implementation of SFAS No. 106 was more informative than the cash 
information. This finding supports the FASB's position that accrual of the postretirement 
liability (as mandated by SFAS No. 106) is necessary.
As mentioned by the author, the study was limited because, at the time of the 
study, very few firms had adopted SFAS No. 106. This made it virtually impossible to fully 
validate the estimates of the PRB liability.
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Leaubv. Ugras. and Welsh 
(1993)
The aim of this study was to determine whether the early adoption of SFAS No. 
106 by sample firms represented earnings management. The authors examined 64 firms 
that had adopted SFAS No. 106 early.
Firms that elected to adopt SFAS No. 106 early had significantly lower earnings in 
the year of adoption than in the prior year. That finding is consistent with the "big bath" 
theory, which maintains that companies will “take a bath” in order to get the bad news out 
all at once.
In addition, most firms (59 o f64) elected immediate recognition ofthe cumulative 
effect of the accounting change. Also, some firms chose to record other nonrecurring 
charges, which further reduced their profitability in the year of adoption. Altogether, these 
accounting charges help substantiate the assertion that those firms that adopted SFAS No. 
106 early intended to show as much bad news as possible during a period of declining 
profits.
Smith (1994)
Smith examined whether previous academic research could have been used by the 
FASB ex ante to the issuance of SFAS No. 106 in order to predict the extent to which the 
management of financially weak firms might defer recognition of the OPEB expense and 
the related transition obligation. Smith sought to establish whether a firm's financial 
condition could be statistically associated with a decision to adopt an income-reducing 
accounting standard before the mandatoiy adoption date. The author also examined
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whether a given firm's financial position was statistically related to management's choice 
regarding the transition alternative (i.e., choosing immediate or deferred expensing of the 
transition obligation).
Smith’s sample consisted of 200 firms, distributed over 38 two-digit SIC codes. 
Rate-regulated and capital-regulated industries were excluded, due to fixed return on 
investment and minimum capital requirements, which would bias observed ratios.
Using Fisher's exact probability test, he also found support for the assertion that 
the probability of the early adoption of SFAS No. 106 was significantly higher for 
financially strong firms (based on profitability) than for financially weak ones. In addition, 
he found that the likelihood of management choosing immediate recognition of the 
transition obligation was significantly higher for more profitable firms than for the less 
profitable companies. The probability, however, o f management choosing immediate 
recognition of the transition obligation was insignificantly higher for more solvent firms 
than for less solvent ones.
This study provides further evidence that financial weakness motivates 
management decisions.
Mittelstaedt. Nichols, and 
Regier(1995)
The purpose of this inquiry was to determine the prevalence, magnitude, and timing 
of retiree health care benefit reductions and to identify their determinants. The authors 
explored three explanations for such benefit reductions: (1) increased contracting costs due
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to the adoption of SFAS No. 106, (2) financial weakness independent ofthe standard and
(3) firm-specific increases in retiree health care costs.
Mittelstaedt et al. developed and tested three hypotheses. The first one was based 
upon the assertions of the contracting cost hypothesis, which maintains that stock prices 
may decline as proposed accounting standards increase the probability that debt covenants 
will be violated.
H1: Firms which reduce retiree health care coverage have higher leverage before 
considering the effects of SFAS No. 106 and/or experience greater increases 
in leverage from SFAS No. 106 than other firms prior to reducing it.
The second hypothesis was based upon prior research [Majluf (1984)] that found 
that financially weak firms liquidate financial slack when internally generated cash flows 
are less than needed. Furthermore, [Mittelstaedt (1989) and Thomas (1989)] have shown 
that overfunded pension plans can be viewed as sources of such slack. These studies found 
that only financially weak firms draw on overfunded pension plans (when other sources 
of capital have been exhausted). The second hypothesis stated:
H2: Firms that reduce retiree health care coverage are financially weaker than 
other firms prior to reducing it.
The third hypothesis was based upon the fact that although health care costs have 
risen due to demographic factors, increases in health care cost inflation rates and decreases 
in Medicare coverage, some firms have been impacted more than others (Rappaport and 
Malone 1993, 25). The third hypothesis stated:
H3: Firms which reduce retiree health care coverage experience greater specific 
increases in health care costs than other firms prior to reduction of coverage.
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The sample consisted o f202 firms, 71 of which reduced health care benefits, and 
131 of which did not. Most of those that had reduced benefits did so either by capping 
expenditures or increasing copayments. The authors did not find a clear ordinal 
relationship between the type and severity of benefits cut.
After performing a univariate analysis, Mittelstaedt et al. found indications that 
benefit-cut firms had significantly higher interaction variable values than no-cut firms. 
These observations support the contracting cost hypothesis (which was the basis for 
Hypothesis 1), as they suggest that managers cut health care benefits partly because ofthe 
adverse financial reporting effect of SFAS No. 106 on debt covenants.
The authors found support for the financial weakness hypothesis, and, therefore, 
Hypothesis 2. The support, however, was not as strong as it was with the pension 
terminators or pension contractors reported by Mittelstaedt (19S9) and Thomas (1989).
Logit models were used to test the third hypothesis. The results of the multivariate 
analysis were consistent with those found with the univariate analysis. The results also 
indicated that financial weakness influences the benefit-cut decisions. Firm-specific 
increases in health care costs appear not to play a significant role in explaining such 
benefit-cut decisions.
Overall, the results suggest that there is a strong associative relationship between 
the decision to cut retiree health care benefits and increased contracting cost created by 
the requirement to adopt SFAS No. 106. This, the authors maintain, suggests that SFAS 
No. 106 provoked managerial actions regarding the timing of cuts in retiree health care 
benefits. The authors' results also suggest that the adoption (or anticipated adoption) of
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SFAS No. 106 is a major factor in OPEB reduction decisions. But adoption of SFAS No. 
106 was not the only factor. Mittelstaedt et al. found support for the financial weakness 
hypothesis, suggesting that firms in weakened financial condition were more likely to 
liquidate pension assets or reduce other postretirement benefits when less costly sources 
of capital became unavailable.
Summary
This study is an extension of the research outlined above. The studies by Askren 
(1991) and Amir (1993) provide evidence of the importance of accruing the OPEB 
obligation. Both determined that the market considered the OPEB obligation as a 
responsibility of the firm even before it was on the balance sheet. Additionally, the fact that 
value-relevance of the OPEB obligation appeared to increase dramatically when accrual 
of this liability became imminent indicated the importance of this issue for investors.
A financial weakness hypothesis will be used in this study since there is 
considerable support for the use of financial weakness as a variable. This can be related to 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), who discovered that firms generally restrict 
dividends or take other steps to maintain financial slack. A firm with ample financial slack 
will be able to acquire funds more cheaply and avoid costs associated with financial 
weakness. Thus, it is considered valuable for the firm. Furthermore, support for the use 
of a financial weakness variable is found in the study done by Stone (1987). This 
investigation found that pension plan reductions were financing decisions, and she also 
noted that the liquidation of excess pension assets was one way to acquire financial slack.
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
Mittelstaedt (1989) discovered that firms terminating pension plans generally were weaker 
financially than those that maintained them. And Thomas (1989) found that financial slack 
was the most likely reason for all pension plan terminations. Such pension plan research 
is relevant to the current study. With pensions there are assets used to fund such plans. 
When firms have an increased need for financial slack, but have exhausted cheaper forms 
of it, they may liquidate pension plan assets. If their financial strength decreases further, 
they may now elect to reduce or terminate them. Since most postretirement benefit 
obligations are unfunded, there are no assets to liquidate, so the first step would be to 
reduce these benefits. Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) extended this assertion regarding 
postretirement benefits and discovered that financial weakness was related to reductions 
and terminations of OPEBs. This provides considerable support for the use of financial 
weakness as a variable.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY 
Pilot Study
This investigation was undertaken to determine whether data would be both readily 
available and accessible and to determine the optimal sample size to be used in the final 
study. Additionally, defects were worked out of statistical formulas and error detection 
methods were developed to aid in minimizing data errors. This pilot study will be referred 
to throughout Chapter 3 and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
The source for financial statement data for this inquiry (and for the final study as 
well) was the SEC’s Edgar Database which contains financial statements from all publicly 
held firms since they must report this information to the SEC. The Edgar database 
provides full disclosure of information for publicly held firms in the United States. The 
data were taken from the 10-K reports. Using a random number generator, firms were 
drawn using the SEC’s company ID numbers. Then, the number was matched with the 
SEC record bearing it. Data for the fiscal years 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 were taken 
from those 10-K filings. Since there might be some variation from year to year, it was 
advisable to examine several years' data. For example, the effect of the OPEB liability
28
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might change over several years, particularly since for most firms, 1994 was the first year 
this liability appeared on the balance sheet.
Description and Justification of Variables
Dependent Variable:
CHG = Dependent variable. Indicator variable coded 0 for no change and 1 for 
change (reduction or termination of OPEBs).
Independent Variables:
TD/TA = Total Debt/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
NI/TA = After-Tax Net Income/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
OCF/TA = Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets—financial weakness variable. 
TL/TA = Total Liabilities/Total Assets—alternative financial weakness variable.
APBO/TA = Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligation (APBO)/Total Assets 
Measures the OPEB liability relative to total assets.
CAP/TA = Change in the OPEB liability (APBO/TA) from the previous year to 
the current year.
INTI = Interaction variable—(TD/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between 
total debt and the OPEB liability.
INT2 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (NI/TA) * (APBO/TA)]—interaction 
between the level of net income and the OPEB liability.
INT3 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (OCF/TA) * APBO/TA]—interaction 
between the levels of cash flow and the OPEB liability.
INT4 = Interaction variable—(TL/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between 
the relationship of liabilities to assets and the OPEB liability.
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Three variables are used to measure financial weakness: Total debt to total assets, 
after-tax income from continuing operations to total assets, and cash flow from operations 
to total assets.
An alternative weakness variable is being used to compare the predictive ability of 
the TD/TA with that of TL/TA. The TD/TA variable is specifically defined as total debt 
plus capital lease payments divided by total assets. It should be a better predictor of 
changes in OPEBs than the TL/TA variable since the total debt variable more directly 
measures a firm’s ability to obtain relatively inexpensive sources of capital. Additionally, 
since the OPEB liability is included in total liabilities, the TD/TA is a better variable as it 
prevents them from overlapping.
All sample firms have adopted SFAS No. 106. Accordingly, the information now 
extant allows one to examine the relationship between the postretirement benefit obligation 
and OPEB plan reductions. APBO/TA, a continuous variable, is used to measure the 
obligation mandated by this accounting standard. And while Mittelstaedt et al. (199S) used 
the adoption of SFAS No. 106 as a variable, this inquiry will instead employ the OPEB 
liability that the adoption of this standard created.
The interaction variables were developed to determine whether the interaction 
between the OPEB liability and any of the financial weakness variables has a stronger 
predictive ability than any of these variables do individually. Although each individual 
financial weakness variable may have some predictive ability, the predictive ability may be 
better if that financial weakness variable is combined with the OPEB liability, which may 
itself have predictive ability. The justification for including interaction variables is based
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upon the postulation that the effects of the variables are multiplicative and not simply 
additive. For instance, assume one variable would increase the probability o f OPEB 
reductions by 10 percent, while another variable would increase this probability by 12 
percent. However, if the two were combined, the probability of OPEB reductions might 
be 60 percent, which is clearly far above the sum of the effects of the individual variables.
The first interaction variable, INTI, attempts to determine if the interaction 
between the debt ratio (TD/TA) and the OPEB liability helps explain the differences in the 
group means better than either variable would individually. As Mittelstaedt et al. (199S) 
determined, there was a relationship between the debt ratio and OPEB plan reductions. 
Additionally, there was a relationship between the SFAS No. 106 adoption and the OPEB 
plan reductions. In this study, the OPEB liability is used in place of the SFAS No. 106 
adoption. It is logical, therefore, to assume that there might be a statistically significant 
relationship between the debt ratio and OPEB reductions and that there also might be a 
significant relationship between the OPEB liability and these reductions. For instance, a 
firm may consider reducing coverage if their debt ratio increases. The firm may also 
consider reducing coverage if the OPEB liability increases. If  the debt ratio increases and 
the OPEB liability increases, this combination of events may be enough to trigger the 
decision to reduce postretirement benefits. Therefore, an interaction variable was created 
to help determine whether these two variables taken together have a stronger predictive 
ability than the two variables would individually.
INT2 represents the interaction between profitability (NI/TA) and the OPEB 
liability. It is logical to assume that there might be a statistically significant relationship
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between profitability and OPEB reductions and, furthermore, that there might also be a 
significant relationship between the OPEB liability and those reductions. A firm may 
consider reducing coverage if profitability declines. The firm may also consider reducing 
coverage if the OPEB liability increases. If  profitability declines and the OPEB liability 
increases, this combination of events may be enough to trigger the decision to reduce 
postretirement benefits. Thus, a second interaction variable was created.
INT3 demonstrates the interaction between operating cash flows (OCF/TA) and 
OPEB liability. It is logical to assume that there might be a statistically significant 
relationship between cash flow and OPEB reductions. It also is reasonable to suspect that 
there is an important relationship between OPEB liability and those reductions. A firm may 
consider reducing coverage if cash flow declines. The firm may also consider reducing 
coverage if the OPEB liability increases. If cash flow declines and the OPEB liability 
increases, this combination of events may be enough to trigger the decision to reduce 
postretirement benefits. Accordingly, a third interaction variable was created.
INT4 is the same as INTI except that it uses TL/TA in lieu of TD/TA. It is 
probable that this variable is less strong than INTI. The TD/TA variable specifically 
considers debt and capital lease payments and not total liabilities. This variable was 
included so that this assumption could be investigated.
All variables were lagged one year in the pilot study and in the final one as well. 
There was a very significant difference in the classificatory power of the lagged versus 
non-lagged variables. Firms are likely to make decisions based upon the results of the 
previous period so it is not surprising to find that lagging variables often enhances their
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predictive ability, as was the case with the Mittelstaedt et al. study. Additionally, the 
Mittelstaedt et al. research found increased statistical significance when interactions were 
used.
Statement of Hypotheses
Discriminant analysis was used in this pilot study to determine the relationship 
between OPEB reduction decisions and several groups of independent variables. These 
latter included the OPEB liability variables, financial weakness variables, and the funding 
level of OPEB plans, dividend level variables, firm age, and firm size. Data were collected 
for five years (1993, 1994, 1995,1996, and 1997). In the final study, the period 1994-97 
was analyzed though not all the 1997 data were available at the time the pilot study was 
done. This period (1993-96) represents the first four-year period in which SFAS No. 106 
had been in effect for all adopters of that statement. The period of 1994-1996 also was 
analyzed, but 1993 data were necessary to create lagged variables for 1994. The following 
hypotheses were tested in the pilot study and in the final study.
Hypothesis 1 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the financial
weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Hypothesis 2 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the level of the
OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
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Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the level of the OPEB
liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Hypothesis 3 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the change in the
level of the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the change in the level
of the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Hypothesis 4 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any ofthe interaction
variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the
interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
The first hypothesis is similar to the first one used by Mittelstaedt et at. (1995). The 
second one is similar to the SFAS No. 106 adoption hypothesis used by Mittelstaedt et al. 
except that it examines the relationship between OPEB reductions and the OPEB liability 
under SFAS No. 106 instead of adoption of the standard. The third hypothesis is an 
extension of the second one and is used to determine whether a change in the OPEB 
liability from one year to the next is related to OPEB plan reductions. The fourth and final 
hypothesis explores the possibility of interactions between several key variables (see 
variable description section).
Use of Discriminant Analysis
Two-group discriminant analysis was used in this study since the dependent 
variable is categorical while the independent variables are continuous. There are two 
groups into which firms may fall: (1) No-change firms (firms which did not reduce
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OPEBs), (2) Change firms (firms that did reduce OPEBs). Two group discriminant 
analysis involves derivation of the linear combination of independent variables that can best 
discriminate between observations in these defined groups. Discriminant analysis multiplies 
each independent variable by an appropriate weight and adds these products together. The 
analysis results in a single composite discriminant score for each firm in the analysis. By 
averaging the discriminant scores for all the firms, it is possible to obtain a group mean 
(called a centroid). The centroids indicate the most typical location of a firm within a 
particular group, and a comparison of the group centroids tells how far apart these are 
along the dimension being tested.
The test for statistical significance of the discriminant function is a generalized 
measure ofthe distance between the two group centroids. This is calculated by comparing 
the distribution of the discriminant scores for the two groups. If the overlap is small, the 
discriminant function separates them well. If, however, the overlap is large, then the 
function only poorly discriminates between these groups.
Assumptions for derivation ofthe discriminant function are multivariate normality 
ofthe populations and unknown (but equal) dispersion and covariance structures for the 
groups. When classification accuracies are determined, one may also assume equal costs 
of misclassification, equal a priori group probabilities, and known dispersion and 
covariation structures. Discriminant analysis is not so sensitive to violations o f these 
assumptions unless, of course, such violations are extreme. Discriminant analysis is even 
less sensitive to such violations when a large sample size is used.
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The main objectives of discriminant analysis are as follows:
1. To establish procedures for classifying statistical units (firms) into groups on 
the basis of their scores on several independent variables, and
2. To determine which of the independent variables account for most of the 
differences in the average score profiles of the two groups.
Accordingly, discriminant analysis is the most appropriate technique for use in this 
study, which attempts to classify firms into two groups (change and no-change).
Two software packages were employed in this analysis. Those same packages were 
used in the main study. The first was Minitab for Windows and the second was NCSS. 
They both gave the same results, although NCSS allowed for the use of stepwise 
discriminant analysis. Accordingly, this is the package from which these findings have been 
printed. The stepwise feature also allows one to automate the procedure of adding and 
deleting independent variables from the model. Variables are entered into the model when 
they are significant. If a variable becomes insignificant in the presence of the other 
variables in the model, however, it is removed. This method maximizes the F-value of the 
entire model and thereby provides the most efficient group of variables for purposes of 
classification.
Summary
The complete model used for the pilot study may be specified as follows:
CHG = CO + C1 *TD/TA + C2*NI/TA + C3 *OCF/TA + C4*TL/TA +
C5*APBO/TA + C6*CAP/TA + C7*INT1 + C8*INT2 + C9*INT3 + 
C10*INT4
Where:
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Dependent Variable:
CHG = Indicator variable coded 0 for no change and 1 for change (reduction or 
termination of OPEBs).
Independent Variables:
TD/TA = Total Debt/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
NI/TA = After-Tax Net Income/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
OCF/TA = Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
TL/TA = Total Liabilities/Total Assets—alternative financial weakness variable.
APBO/TA = Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligation (APBO)/Total Assets 
Measures the OPEB liability relative to total assets.
CAP/TA = Change in the OPEB liability (APBO/TA) from the previous year to the 
current year.
INT1 = Interaction variable—(TD/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between total 
debt and the OPEB liability.
INT2 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (NI/TA) * (APBO/TA)]—interaction 
between the level of net income and the OPEB liability.
INT3 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (OCF/TA) * APBO/TA]—interaction 
between the levels of cash flow and the OPEB liability.
INT4 = Interaction variable—(TL/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between the 
relationship of liabilities to assets and the OPEB liability.
Sample Selection
The sample used in the pilot study consisted of 125 firms which remained after 
those in rate regulated industries were eliminated. As described by Smith (1994) and 
Mittelstaedt, et al. (1995), the treatment of utilities’ health care costs is regulated by state 
commissions. Their rates are also regulated and this, in turn, greatly narrows the possible
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earnings range, which violates the underlying assumption that the firms operate in a free 
market. Additionally, the financial ratios of utilities and financial institutions are much 
different from those of firms in other industries. Since financial weakness is believed to be 
highly correlated with OPEB reductions, it was necessary to discard these firms from the 
sample.
After excluding utilities and financial institutions, firms not offering OPEBs were 
discarded, thus reducing the final sample size to 42,45, and 45 for 1994, 1995, and 1996 
respectively. For three of those firms, there were no data available for 1993. This made 
lagging of variables impossible for 1994. Accordingly, these three were dropped from the 
analysis for that year. Of the sampled firms, however, 6 had benefit reductions with 2 
occurring in each year. The fact that out of 125 films only 45 offered OPEBs is consistent 
with research which found that the adoption of SFAS No. 106 was statistically significant 
in explaining OPEB reductions and terminations. Earlier information suggested that a 
much higher percentage of firms offered OPEBs.
Given the small proportion of change firms found in the holdout sample, a 
collection o f 1,632 firms will be used for the final study. This is based upon the following 
formula for computing necessary sample size:
Z 2p ( \ - p )
E 2
Where:
Z = z score based upon a significance level of .05
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p = proportion of change firms to total firms
E = error
Which yields:
The calculation is as follows:
(1.96)2.044444(.955556) 
( 01)2 
(3.8416)(.042469) 
.0001
This gives us n: 1631.492 =
.1631492
.0001
The error (E) is set at 1 percent. If this had been 2 percent, the necessary sample 
size would be only 408 firms. Changing the error to 1 percent, however, requires instead 
a sample size of 1,632 firms. Given the accuracy of a 1 percent error compared with that 
of a 2 percent error, it appears that the increased sample size is needed. If  the current 
proportion of change firms to total firms holds for the larger sample, one would expect 
that the number of change firms would be approximately 72 for each year. On the other 
hand, if the sample were only 408 firms, the number of change firms instead would be 18, 
which would be quite small. The final sample, however, did not consist o f 1,632 firms. The 
reasons for this are stated below.
The proportion of change to total firms was extremely small in the sample used for 
the pilot study. It was assumed that this same proportion existed in the large sample. The 
small proportion of change firms could have been responsible for some of the decreased 
classificatory power of the discriminant analysis used in the pilot study. In the pilot study 
sample, only two change firms were found in the sample of 45 (2 out of 42 for 1994). 
Therefore, someone could simply assume that all firms were no-change firms, and he or
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she would be more than 95 percent accurate! When the prior probabilities are so skewed, 
it could cause the discriminant analysis to lose some of its ability to separate individual 
observations into groups. To combat this potential problem, the sample of non-change 
firms was systematically reduced. This would have resulted in a final sample of 
approximately 450 to 500 firms. The proportion of change to no-change firms would have 
been approximately 15 percent, which would be somewhat less skewed than the 
proportion in the sample used in the pilot study. As explained in Chapter 5, the final 
sample was much smaller than the proposed 450 to 500 firms.
All firms in the utility and financial services industries were eliminated from the 
sample in the pilot study. They were, of course, removed from the main sample as well. 
As was the case in the pilot study, firms were selected which do not offer postretirement 
benefits at all, and they were eliminated. Thus, they were not considered in the size of the 
total sample.
Since financial statement data are often restated in subsequent years, the most 
recent data will be used for all years. For example, both 1997 and 1996 data will be taken 
from the 1997 comparative financial statements, while 1995 data will be taken from the 
1996 comparative financial statements, and so on. Not all of the fiscal years end 
simultaneously (e.g., December 31). This, however, should not be a problem here, as there 
were no major economic shifts during the period examined. The data were not stratified 
by industry since there were so few change firms during this time frame.
A random sample of firms was taken from the SEC’s Edgar database using a 
random number generator. The sample size of 125 was used for the pilot study. It was
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inevitable, of course, that some of the firms do (or did not) offer OPEBs. These 
observations would be automatically eliminated. Similar sampling procedures were used 
in the final study.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS FROM THE PILOT STUDY 
Significance of the Preliminary Findings
Since discriminant analysis is used to classify data into groups, the first step is to 
determine if the means of the two groups are statistically significantly different. If they are 
not, discriminant analysis will be unable to determine accurately the group into which a 
particular observation fits.
Therefore, means tests were performed on all independent variables for the two 
groups for each year. The variables for which the means were significantly different were 
also determined to have explanatory power in the final models for each year, as shown 
below.
Analysis was done using prior probabilities that were determined based upon the 
sample used in the pilot study. First, the probability of a firm being represented in group 
0 (no change) was assumed to be .95 and the probability of a firm being represented in 
group 1 (change) was assumed to be .05. The justification for the use of these prior 
probability figures was the proportion of change firms to total firms in the sample. There 
were only two change firms out of a total of 45 firms (42 firms for 1994). This proportion 
was rounded to .05, providing the prior probability of a firm being in group 1.
42
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Preliminary findings support the assertion that, for 1994, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between INTI and OPEB reductions.
Hypothesis 1 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the financial 
weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the 
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
The cash flow variable is not significant at the .05 level, but the interaction variable
measuring the interaction of after-tax income and OPEB liability is significant at this
confidence level. The OPEB liability variable by itself is not significant, nor is the NI/TA
variable. Using .05 as the critical level of confidence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
for hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the level of the OPEB 
liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the level o f the OPEB 
liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
For hypothesis 2, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis, since the OPEB 
liability is, by itself, not significant.
Hypothesis 3 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the change in the level 
o f the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the change in the level 
o f the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
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The null hypothesis for hypothesis 3 is not rejected since the change in the OPEB 
liability does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction 
decisions.
Hypothesis 4 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the interaction 
variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the 
interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
The null hypothesis is rejected in the case of hypothesis 4 since one of the 
interaction variables is significant at the .05 level (see Table 2). In fact, this suggests that 
there may be a significant relationship between the interaction of cash flow level and both 
OPEB liability level and OPEB reductions. The cash flow variable by itself was not 
significant at the .05 level (see Table 2). On the other hand, there might be a significant 
relationship between after-tax income and OPEB liability levels when the interaction of 
both variables is considered. Overall, the predictive ability of the significant variables is 
accurate, as 41 ofthe 42 observations were classified correctly (see Table 1). The one firm 
that was misclassified (observation 3) had values for all variables that were statistically 
insignificantly different from the means for group 0, so discriminant analysis was unable 
to classify it correctly as a member of group 1. This may be attributable to the small 
sample size.
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CONFUSIC N MAI R i x S
PREDICTED
0 1
0 40 0 40
ACTUAL
1 1 1 2
41 1 42
VARIABLE F-VALUE I PROB. > F
OCF/TA 3.30 .0755
INTI 6.10 1 .0181
There appears to be a much stronger statistical relationship between several 
variables and the OPEB reductions for 1995. In fact, all the interaction variables as well 
as the OPEB liability variables are significant at the .05 level (see Table 4). None of the 
financial weakness variables, however, are significant by themselves. Given these results, 
it would appear that the OPEB liability was the trigger for such reductions. Certainly when 
combined with financial weakness variables, the statistical relationship appears even more 
significant. Since none of the financial weakness variables are significant by themselves, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1. All OPEB variables and all interaction 
variables appear to be significant, so we can reject the null hypothesis for hypotheses 2,
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3, and 4. The significant variables for 1995 classified all 45 observations correctly (see 
Table 3).
l i l l l l l
PREDICTED 
0 1
0
ACTUAL
43 0 43
1 0 2 2
43 2 45
^ I
VARIABLE F-VALUE PROB. > F
INTI 5.0 .0315
INT2 605.7 <.0000
INT3 504.8 <.0000
CAP/TA 11.4 .0017
APBO/TA 13.4 .0008
For 1996, however, relationships were considerably weaker. There does appear to 
be a weak relationship between cash flows and OPEB reductions though it was not strong 
enough to be significant at the .05 level. Accordingly, we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
for hypothesis 1. Furthermore, since there are no other variables with statistically 
significant relationships, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis for hypotheses 2, 3, and 
4. The classificatory power of the cash flow variable was not particularly strong. This may
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be attributable to the small size of the sample. Both firms in group 1 were mis-classified. 
Analysis of the data revealed that the values of all variables for these two firms were 
statistically insignificantly different from the means for group 0, so discriminant analysis 
was unable to classify them correctly as members of group 1.
CONFPP B B B M
PREDICTED
0 l
0 43 0 43
ACTUAL
1 2 0 2
45 0 45
i M uj
VARIABLE F-VALUE PROB. > F
OCF/TA 3.80 .0568
Overall, there does appear to be a relationship between OPEB liability levels and 
OPEB reductions as well as a relationship between some of the financial weakness 
variables and OPEB reductions. At this juncture, it would be logical to conclude that the 
wide variation in predictive ability and the exact variables that are related to the reductions 
is partially due to the small sample size. Although the sample size of 45 firms (42 for 1994) 
is not especially small itself, there were only two change firms for each year in this
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sub-sample. In the final study, the larger sample size was expected to reduce these wide 
variations between years. However, since the sample contained a very small percentage 
of change firms, the sample had to be reduced by eliminating many of the no-change firms. 
This systematic reduction of ihe sample did reduce the prior probabilities to .50 and .50, 
so the results were still more reliable than those from the pilot study where the prior 
probabilities were approximately .95 and .05. It appears that the wide variations between 
years were largely eliminated in the final study, but it was probably the dramatic reduction 
in the prior probabilities that reduced these variations. The primary justification for 
stratifying the sample by year was to explore the possibility that the significance of the 
OPEB liability had changed overtime, especially since the adoption of SFAS No. 106 itself 
was no longer an issue.
During the pilot study, some variables were removed. Originally, there was a 
variable comparing the degree of postretirement benefit plan funding to reductions in those 
plans. Although there should have been a negative correlation between plan funding and 
reductions in those plans, so few of them were funded that the variable was not 
meaningful. This variable was excluded from the final study. Firm size, another variable, 
was found to be insignificant since most of the smaller companies appear not to offer 
postretirement benefits. The size variable was not expected to be significant and the 
findings support that assertion. Additionally, and as expected, the variable TL/TA had a 
significantly weaker classificatory power than TD/TA. Similarly, INT4 was much weaker 
than INTI. For example, in 1995, all the interaction variables were significant except 
INT4.
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The fact that so few firms (45 of 125) actually offered postretirement benefits was 
a significant finding by itself. Pre-SFAS No. 106 research suggested that a much higher 
percentage of firms offered such benefits than was found in the data search post-SFAS No. 
106. This is consistent with the findings of Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) and others who found 
that the adoption of this financial accounting standard was a significant factor in OPEB 
reductions in periods prior to the one being studied here. Furthermore, a study by the 
consulting firm William M. Mercer found that in 1998, the percentage of companies with 
at least 500 employees that provide OPEBs has dropped to 36 percent, down from 46 
percent in 1993.5 These figures show that OPEB plan reductions continued after the 
adoption of SFAS No. 106. One goal of this study was to determine what might have 
caused the reductions during this time period.
In addition to the above findings, the pilot study has provided the proportion of 
change forms to the total number of firms, greatly simplifying the determination of sample 
size needed for the final study.
Limitations of the Pilot Study
The most significant limitation has been the small sample size. Although this has 
proven to be a significant restriction in the analysis of the results, it has been instrumental 
in determining the sample size to be used in the final study. Another problem is the time 
period. At this juncture, it would appear that other methodologies such as those used by
5 “Enrollment in Employee-Sponsored HMO/POS Plans Drops, While Health Plan Costs 
Jump 6.1%.” Mercer USA Resource Center, January 26, 1999.
Reproduced with permission o fthe  copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) cannot be utilized here. Those authors lagged some of the 
financial weakness variables three years. Since lagging 1994 would mean using 1991 
data, there would be a considerable problem because SFAS No. 106 had not yet been 
adopted by all firms. The required date of adoption was for financial statements with 
periods ending after December 15,1992. Lagging variables one year increased the model’s 
classificatory power, but it will be several years before the three-year lagging can be used.
Discussion o f  the M ain Study 
The major difference between the main study and the pilot study was sample size. 
Two variables that were used in the pilot study were not put to use in the final study. 
These were “weeded out” during the pilot study because of their insignificance. In fact, 
they were never included in the model. First, the plan assets (OPEB funding) variable was 
nonrelevant due to the extremely small number of firms funding their postretirement 
benefit plans. Second, the size variable was insignificant due to the fact that all the firms 
in the sample were rather similar in size. Accordingly, the size and plan assets variables 
were not used in the main study.
Since the variable TL/TA has shown some classificatory power, it was retained as 
will INT4. It is not anticipated that these variables will be kept in the final model, but they 
will not be discarded at this time. It is likely that they will be dropped in favor of TD/TA 
and INTI. The methodology to be used in the main study will be the same as that 
employed in the pilot study except for sample size and the elimination of variables found
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to be irrelevant. The model to be used in the final study is identical to the one used in the 
pilot study except that the new prior probabilities are expected to be .85 and .15.
Summary of the Pilot Study* s Findings
The pilot study has shown some evidence supporting the assertion that financial 
weakness and the level of OPEB liability are related to a firm’s decision to reduce the level 
of postretirement benefits it offers its employees. There, however, is a considerable degree 
of variability between years though this may be attributable, at least in part, to the small 
sample size of change firms. Actually, the small number of change firms makes it quite 
difficult to draw inferences from the pilot study’s findings.
The small number of firms offering OPEBs relative to the total number of firms 
set aside for the pilot study is in itself a significant finding. It supports the expectation that 
the adoption of SFAS No. 106 did have an effect on the decision to reduce or eliminate 
postretirement benefits. It also required an increase in the necessary sample size to be used 
in the final study.
Preliminary Conclusions Based Upon Pilot Study
There appears to be a weak relationship between both financial weakness and the 
level ofthe OPEB liability in the reduction of postretirement benefits. It may be possible, 
of course, to define these relationships more clearly using a larger sample.
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Implementation of the Pilot Study Revelations 
into the Final Study
The results from the pilot study indicated that a number of issues required further 
inquiry. First, the variability between years was unlikely to be completely due to the small 
sample size in the pilot study, but it may have been the primary cause of such variations. 
The prior probabilities were quite extreme in the pilot study, which could have caused 
much of the variability as well. Both issues were addressed in the final study, and the 
variability between years was found to be considerably smaller. In fact, the variations were 
too small to affect the model’s classificatory power significantly.
Second, in the next few years, enough post-SFAS No. 106 adoption data will be 
available to allow one to explore other methodologies, including those requiring significant 
lagging of variables. In fact, the ability to lag variables more than one year might be able 
to help determine whether OPEB reduction decisions are based on long-term or short-term 
trends. For example, if the variables lose explanatory power as they are lagged by more 
periods, we might be able to conclude that these decisions are made using only recent 
developments rather than from the analysis of a trend that covers several years. This could 
not be addressed in the final study since the data were not available at the time the study 
was conducted.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS FROM THE FINAL STUDY 
Introduction
This chapter presents the results of a discriminant analysis of sample data to 
determine whether firms can be classified into one of two groups based on financial 
weakness and the level of the OPEB liability that must be disclosed in accordance with 
SFAS No. 106. Four stages of analysis were performed. First, the full sample was 
analyzed. The model exhibited very weak classificatory power, as it classified nearly every 
firm in the sample as a no-change firm. The prior probabilities (the probability of an 
observation in the actual sample belonging to one group versus the other) were extreme 
in the full sample with 97 percent of the firms being no-change firms (98 percent for 1994). 
Because of this, discriminant analysis may have lost much of its ability to separate firms 
and place them into the proper group. Thus, many of the firms could have been “forced” 
into group 0 due to the overwhelming probability that a sample firm would belong to this 
group. The fact that several variables were significant at the .05 level despite the model 
having very little classificatory power would suggest that either the variables should not 
have been significant, or that the model should have possessed better classificatory power. 
Therefore, a second analysis was necessary.
53
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In the second analysis, the no-change firms were systematically removed from the 
sample so that the prior probabilities would be less extreme. With the reduction of no­
change firms, this was lowered to 85 percent for all years except 1994, when they were 
90 percent. The results from this second analysis were nearly identical to what was 
discovered in the first run of the data. Again, the model classified nearly every firm as a 
no-change firm. In addition, several variables again were found to be significant, despite 
the model’s lack of classificatory power. This persistent inconsistency in the empirical 
results again raised the suspicion that the prior probabilities were causing many of the 
firms to be misclassified as no-change firms. Accordingly, steps were taken to force the 
prior probabilities into a more reasonable range to see if this indeed was the case.
As a result, a third analysis was performed. In this analysis, each change firm was 
taken and matched with a no-change firm of similar size (based on the level of total assets). 
This reduced the prior probabilities to exactly .50 and .50, since in this smaller sample, 
there was an equal number of change and no-change firms for each year. The results of this 
analysis showed that many more firms were being classified as change firms, and the 
classificatory power of the model was significantly better than that found in the first two 
analyses. Again, several of the variables were found to be significant at the .05 level. This 
time, the model’s classificatory ability was consistent with expectations. The model still 
misclassified some of the firms, but it was no longer misclassifying a large number of 
change firms as no-change ones. It appears that most of the misclassifications were now 
due to a somewhat weak relationship between the independent variables and OPEB plan 
reductions.
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Finally, since no clearly identifiable year-to-year trends had been discovered, the 
data set used in the third analysis was rerun without regard to the year of change. The 
results were similar to those found in the third analysis, but the model’s classificatory 
power was somewhat diminished. This suggests that the year of change may have some 
limited significance, and that there is justification for performing the analysis on a year-by- 
year basis.
The results of this investigation are somewhat inconsistent with the findings of 
prior OPEB and pension research. The results obtained in this study suggest that the 
relationships between financial weakness and OPEB plan reductions might have changed 
since the adoption of SFAS No. 106. At this point, it appears that both the degree of 
financial weakness and the level of the OPEB liability are associated with increased plan 
reduction decisions, but not as strongly as they were prior to the adoption of SFAS No. 
106. However, further research is necessary to confirm or refute these findings.
Sample Selection in the Final Study
The total number of firms offering OPEBs at the end of fiscal 1993 was only 588 
after deleting rate regulated firms, so this entire group was used in the first stage of the 
analysis. All but four of these firms contain data for all five years (1993-1997). There 
were 585 usable observations for 1997,588 observations for 1996, and 587 for both 1995 
and 1994. There were 18 change firms in both 1997 and 1996, 19 in 1995, and 12 in 
1994. The ratio of change firms to the total number of firms is smaller than it was in the 
pilot study. The data were gathered from the SEC’s Edgar database.
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For the second analysis, the sample size was reduced to 120 firms in an effort to 
bring prior probabilities into a less extreme range. After the second analysis failed to show 
any improvement in discriminant analysis’ ability to classify firms, the sample was further 
downsized to include only change firms matched with no-change firms of similar size. In 
the third analysis, the total sample size was 36 in 1997 and 1996, 38 in 1995, and 24 in 
1994.
Variables Used in the Final Study
From the results of the pilot study, the variables TL/TA and the associated 
interaction variable, INT4, which was defined as (TL/TA)*(APBO/TA), were dropped 
from the model. In the place of these deleted variables, OI/TA (operating income/total 
assets) and a new INT4, defined as (inverse of OI/TA)*(APBO/TA), were added. The 
operating income/total assets variable was added to determine if the classificatory power 
of a pre-tax income figure would be stronger than that of net income, which is an after-tax 
figure. In addition, net income can be affected by extraordinary items along with gains and 
losses from discontinued operations and adjustments caused by changes in accounting 
methods.
During the data gathering process in this final study, several other variables were 
added. During the pilot study, a change variable (CAP/TA) was employed. This variable 
was added to determine if a statistically significant relationship existed between the change 
in the OPEB liability level from one year to the next and OPEB reduction decisions. 
Because there are changes from year-to-year in all the financial weakness variables as well
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as in the OPEB liability, the change variables were expanded to include the year-to-year
changes in the financial weakness variables. Additionally, four new interaction variables
were developed. These new interaction variables are similar to the original four interaction
variables except that the new ones are related to the newly created change variables.
Accordingly, the full model used in this final study was defined as follows:
CHG= CO + C1*TD/TA + C2*NI/TA + C3*OCF/TA + C4*OI/TA + 
C5* APBO/TA + C6*CTD/TA + C7*CNI/TA + C8*COCF/TA + 
C9*COI/TA + C10*CAP/TA + Cl 1 *INT1 + C12*INT2 + C13*INT3 + 
C14*INT4 + C15*INT5 + C16*INT6 + C17*INT7 + C18*INT8
Where:
Dependent Variable:
CHG = Indicator variable coded 0 for no change and 1 for change (reduction or 
termination of OPEBs).
Independent Variables:
TD/TA = Total Debt/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
NI/TA = After-Tax Net Income/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
OCF/TA = Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
OI/TA = Total Liabilities/Total Assets—alternative financial weakness variable.
APBO/TA = Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligation (APBO)/Total Assets 
Measures the OPEB liability relative to total assets.
CTD/T A = Change in the first financial weakness variable (TD/T A) from the previous 
year to the current year.
CNI/TA = Change in the second financial weakness variable (NI/TA) from the 
previous year to the current year.
COCF/TA= Change in the third financial weakness variable (OCF/TA) from the 
previous year to the current year.
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COI/TA= Change in the fourth financial weakness variable (OI/TA) from the 
previous year to the current year.
CAP/TA = Change in the OPEB liability (APBO/TA) from the previous year to the 
current year.
INTI = Interaction variable—(TD/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between total 
debt and the OPEB liability.
INT2 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (NI/TA) * (APBO/TA)]—interaction 
between the level of net income and the OPEB liability.
INT3 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (OCF/TA) * APBO/TA]—interaction 
between the levels of cash flow and the OPEB liability.
INT4 = Interaction variable—(Inverse of OI/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction 
between the relationship of operating income to assets and the OPEB 
liability.
INT5 = Interaction variable—(CTD/TA) * (CAP/TA)—interaction between the 
change in total debt and the change in the OPEB liability.
INT6 = Interaction variable—[Inverse o f (CNI/TA) * (CAP/TA)]—interaction 
between the change in net income and the change in the OPEB liability.
INT7 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (COCF/TA) * CAP/TA]—interaction 
between the change in cash flow and the change in the OPEB liability.
INT8 = Interaction variable—(Inverse of COI/TA) * (CAP/TA)—interaction 
between the change in operating income to assets and the change in the 
OPEB liability.
Hypotheses Used in the Final Study
For this final study, two additional hypotheses were introduced. The first, which 
was an extension of the third hypothesis from the pilot study, was used to determine 
whether the year-to-year changes in the financial weakness variables were related to OPEB 
plan reductions. The second new hypothesis would test for a possible statistical
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relationship between interaction variables 5 through 8 and OPEB reductions noted among 
sample firms.
As a consequence of these changes, the hypotheses used in this final study could 
be stated as:
Hypothesis 1 is as follows:
1. Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the financial
weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the 
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Hypothesis 2 is as follows:
2. Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the level of the
OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the level of the 
OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Hypothesis 3 is as follows:
3. Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the change in the
level o f the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the change in the 
level of the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Hypothesis 4 is as follows:
4. Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the change in the
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the change in the 
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Hypothesis 5 is as follows:
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5. Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the first
four interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the 
first four interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample 
firms.
Hypothesis 6 is as follows:
6. Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the second
four interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the 
second four interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample 
firms.
Means Tests
As was the case in the pilot study, the first step in using discriminant analysis was 
to determine if the means of the two groups (change versus no-change) were significantly 
different. If  they were not, discriminant analysis could not accurately define whether a 
given observation would fit into a particular group. Accordingly, MANOVA tests were 
now employed for the two groups for each year. These means tests again showed that the 
variables for which there were differences between group means had statistical significance 
in the final models for each year. For 1995, however, means tests did not find any of these 
variables to be statistically different between these two groups, which suggests that 
discriminant analysis would be useless for that year.
Results from the First Stage of Data Analysis
The first analysis performed used prior probabilities that were determined by the 
sample used in the final study. First, the probability of a firm being represented in group
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0 (no change) was assumed to be .97 for all years except 1994, and the probability of a 
firm being represented in group 1 (change) was assumed to be .03 for the same period. 
For 1994, on the other hand, the probabilities were .98 and .02 for group 0 and group 1, 
respectively. Justification for use of these prior probability figures was based upon the 
proportion of change firms to total firms in the sample studied. For the second stage of the 
analysis, the sample size was systematically reduced to 120 firms to bring the prior 
probabilities into a less extreme range.
Summary of Results Using the 
Full Sample
1994 Results. For 1994, the null hypothesis was rejected for hypothesis 5, since
both INTI93 and INT493 were significant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis was also 
rejected for hypothesis 6, as INT594 was found to be significant at the .05 level. For all 
other hypotheses, we could not reject the null hypothesis. Since the model was unable to 
classify many of the firms correctly, these results appear not to be particularly meaningful.
Overall, the results for 1994 indicated that the predictive ability of the model was 
very poor since only 574 of the 587 observations were classified correctly (see Table 7 and 
Table 8). Nearly all of the misclassified firms were change firms that were placed into 
group 0 (no-change). The classificatory accuracy of the model was 97.6 percent, but given 
the fact that 98 percent of the firms in the sample were no-change firms, one could actually 
do slightly better by positing that all the firms in the sample were no-change firms. Since 
three variables were significant at the .05 level, it would be normal to expect the model to
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have reasonably good classificatory power. Since it did not, it is likely that the extreme 
prior probabilities caused discriminant analysis to “force” observations into the dominant 
group, which in this case is group 0.
< X < <
PREDICTED 
0 1
ACTUAL
0
1
573 2
11 1
584
575
12
587
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
38 1 0 0.997 0.003
133 0 1 0.301 0.699
138 1 0 0.997 0.003
169 1 0 0.997 0.003
180 1 0 0.997 0.003
249 1 0 0.997 0.003
267 1 0 0.993 0.007
297 1 0 0.997 0.003
308 1 0 1.000 0.000
323 1 0 0.997 0.003
338 1 0.019 0.981
350 1 0 0.976 0.024
386 1 0 0.997 0.003
The results for 1994 suggested that some of the OPEB reduction decisions might 
be related both to debt levels and to OPEB liability levels experienced in the prior year of 
1993. However, since the model’s classificatory power was poor, this could not be 
confirmed by the results obtained in the first analysis.
1995 R esults. As the results from the means tests indicated, the relationships 
were weaker in 1995. None of the 6 hypotheses were rejected, since none of the variables 
were significant at the .05 level. The discriminant analysis failed to classify correctly any
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of the change firms, but all the no-change firms were classified correctly. It appears that 
there is no statistically significant relationship between any of the independent variables 
and OPEB reduction decisions during 1995. Again, the problems caused by extreme prior 
probabilities probably make these results rather meaningless.
FIRST STAGE
PREDICTED 
0 1
0
ACTUAL
568 0 568
1 19 0 19
587 0 587
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Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
1 1 0 0.972 0.028
96 1 0 0.967 0.033
112 1 0 0.970 0.030
135 1 0 0.971 0.029
145 1 0 0.975 0.025
158 1 0 0.973 0.027
210 1 0 0.971 0.029
252 1 0 0.968 0.032
259 1 0 0.968 0.032
285 1 0 0.840 0.160
321 1 0 0.938 0.062
428 1 0 0.975 0.025
436 1 0 0.973 0.027
441 1 0 0.965 0.035
463 1 0 0.972 0.028
501 1 0 0.975 0.025
511 1 0 0.975 0.025
545 1 0 0.966 0.034
570 1 0 0.979 0.021
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As shown in Table 9 and Table 10, the data for 1995 show no evidence that any 
of the OPEB reductions were related to any of the variables in the full model. For 1995, 
the model again classified firms about as accurately as a random selection.
1996 Results. The TD/TA95 variable was statistically significant at the .05 level
and, accordingly, the null hypothesis was rejected for hypothesis 1. Again, however, since 
the model did not have strong classificatory power, this may have little meaning.
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for hypothesis 2, but it was rejected for 
hypothesis 3 since the change in OPEB liability did appear to have a statistically significant 
relationship with OPEB reductions. Once again, this may be considered insignificant given 
the weakness of the model as a whole.
For hypothesis 4, the null hypothesis was rejected since the CTD/TA96 variable 
was significant at the .05 level. Due to the model’s lack of classificatory power, the 
significance of the variable loses its meaning.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 5 was also rejected because both INT395 and 
INT495 were significant at the .05 level. Again, due to the classificatory weakness of the 
overall model, the rejection of the hypothesis loses its meaningfiilness.
Finally, the null hypothesis was not rejected for hypothesis 6 because none of the 
second group of interaction variables were significant at the .05 level.
As a group, the ability of the model to predict was very weak since only 567 of the 
588 observations were classified correctly (see Table 11 and Table 12). This gives a 
classificatory accuracy of 96.4 percent, which is less precise than a postulation that all
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firms belonged in group 0. Moreover, most of the misclassified firms were change firms 
that were erroneously placed into the no-change group. This provides further evidence that 
discriminant analysis might have been reacting negatively to the extreme prior probabilities, 
especially since several variables were statistically significant in 1996.
■111
PREDICTED 
0 1
ACTUAL
565 5 570
16 2 18
58! 7 588
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Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
7 1 0 0.921 0.079
15 1 0 0.774 0.226
26 1 0 0.994 0.006
49 1 0.030 0.970
133 1 0.189 0.811
154 1 0 0.997 0.003
174 1 0 0.954 0.046
187 1 0 0.989 0.011
189 1 0 0.978 0.022
195 1 0.273 0.727
204 1 0 0.984 0.016
267 1 0 0.815 0.185
270 1 0 0.707 0.293
297 1 0 0.975 0.025
321 1 0.476 0.524
340 1 0 0.985 0.015
347 1 0 0.977 0.023
387 1 0 0.992 0.008
448 1 0 0.984 0.016
487 0 1 0.362 0.638
492 1 0 0.908 0.092
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In 1996, results once again suggested that some of the OPEB reduction decisions 
were based upon both levels of and changes in several key variables, but since the model 
lacked classificatory power, these relationships are unlikely to be meaningful.
1997 R esults. For 1997, the financial weakness variables were found to be
insignificant, so using .05 as the critical confidence level, it was impossible to reject the 
null hypothesis for the first hypothesis. There did not appear to be a significant 
relationship between financial weakness variables and OPEB reduction decisions during 
1997.
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for hypothesis 2 or hypothesis 3. With 
hypothesis 4, however, the null hypothesis was rejected since the variable CTD/TA97 was 
significant at the .05 level. Since the model lacked classificatory power once again, the 
relevance of this statistical significance is lost. The null hypothesis was not rejected for 
hypotheses 5 or 6.
Altogether, the classificatory accuracy of the model was quite weak with only 568 
of 585 being classified correctly (see Table 13 and Table 14). Again, the model’s 
classificatory power resembled that of a biased guess that all firms were no-change firms. 
As was the case for the other years, most of the misclassified firms were change firms 
misidentified as no-change firms, further strengthening the assertion that discriminant 
analysis was losing much of its power to an extreme set of prior probabilities.
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FIRST STAGE
PREDICTED 
0 1
0
ACTUAL
565 2 567
1 17 1 18
582 3 585
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^ m
Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
47 1 0 0.977 0.023
173 1 0 0.978 0.022
179 1 0.211 0.789
273 1 0 0.946 0.054
282 2 0.255 0.845
290 1 0 0.986 0.014
303 1 0 0.956 0.044
320 1 0 0.982 0.018
324 1 0 0.963 0.037
333 1 0 0.979 0.021
403 1 0 0.978 0.022
410 1 0 0.811 0.189
444 1 0 0.965 0.035
456 1 0 0.985 0.015
478 1 0 0.975 0.025
495 1 0 0.897 0.103
507 1 0 0.983 0.017
527 1 0 0.944 0.056
576 1 0 0.985 0.015
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The results for 1997 found only one variable to be of consequence. Of course, with 
the poor performance o f the model, the variable’s significance is not particularly relevant 
at this point.
The fact that nearly all the firms were being classified as no-change firms in each 
year raised the question as to whether discriminant analysis was trying to “force” 
observations into group 0, since almost all the observations in the full sample belong to 
that group. For each year, the model classified nearly all the firms as no-change firms 
(group 0), which would tend to support this assertion. If this were to change in the second 
stage of analysis where the sample size was systematically reduced, it might provide 
further evidence that the prior probabilities were causing discriminant analysis to 
inappropriately classify change firms (group 1) as no-change firms (group 0). However, if 
this were to occur with the reduced sample, it could suggest that either the prior 
probabilities were still too extreme or that the classification errors were due mainly to the 
variables’ poor classificatory power. If the results from the second analysis again showed 
several variables to be significant while the model still misdassified nearly all the change 
firms, it would suggest that the model’s classificatory limitations were most likely due to 
the still rather extreme prior probabilities. Obviously, no direct comparison can be made 
between an analysis of the full sample with one of a reduced sample.
Results from the Second Stage of Data Analysis
The sample was reduced for the second analysis to determine whether the extreme 
prior probabilities were causing the discriminant analysis to classify change firms
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incorrectly as no-change firms. Since the prior probabilities with the full sample were even 
more extreme than those in the pilot study, the systematic reduction of the sample of no­
change firms proposed in Chapter 3 was necessary. The total sample was reduced from 
588 firms to 120, which changed the prior probabilities to .85 and . 15 for 1997 and 1996, 
.84 and .16 for 1995, and .90 and .10 for 1994. These figures are similar to those proposed 
in Chapter 3. The reduced sample was originally expected to contain between 450 and 500 
firms, but since the total number of firms offering OPEBs during the period of study was 
less than the proposed sample of 1,632 firms, the reduced sample had to be reduced to 120 
to obtain the prior probabilities proposed in Chapter 3. The justification for this reduction 
is that when prior probabilities are really extreme, discriminant analysis tends to lose some 
of its ability to separate individual observations into groups. With the prior probabilities 
in the full sample, one would be 97 percent to 98 percent accurate by guessing that all 
firms in the sample were no-change firms. As can be seen by the results of the analysis of 
the full sample, the model did not classify observations any more accurately than such a 
postulation.
From the analysis of the full sample, the model’s classificatory power was very 
weak in each year, despite some of the variables being statistically significant. The results 
of the second analysis showed that the classificatory power of the model again was very 
weak. In addition, several variables were statistically significant at the .05 level. 
Discriminant analysis still classified very few of the firms as members of group 1, which 
was consistent with the findings in the first stage of the analysis. It appears that the results 
in the second stage of the analysis were confounded by the effects of extreme prior
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probabilities or a poor model. Although the prior probabilities were less extreme than 
those in the first analysis, they still appear to be causing the same statistical problem. 
Despite the statistical significance of several variables, the model’s classificatory power 
again resembled that of a guess that all firms were no-change firms.
1994 R esults. The results for 1994 indicate that most of the firms were classified 
as group 0 firms (no-change). In addition, 11 firms were misclassified, so the model’s 
classificatory power of 90.8 percent is just slightly better than the 90.0 percent accuracy 
of a guess (based on prior probabilities) that all firms would belong to group 0.
PREDICTED 
0 I
0
ACTUAL
106 2 108
1 9 3 12
US 5 120
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h p h
1111111
Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
8 1 0 0.942 0.058
12 0 1 0.410 0.590
21 1 0 0.977 0.023
28 0 1 0.440 0.560
29 1 0 0.955 0.045
34 1 0 0.981 0.019
45 1 0 0.970 0.030
50 1 0 0.782 0.218
61 1 0 0.971 0.029
70 1 0 0.967 0.033
79 1 0 0.957 0.043
1995 Results. The results for 1995 show that nearly all firms were classified as 
group 0 (no-change) firms and that almost all the misclassified firms were group 1 firms 
erroneously placed into group 0. The classificatory accuracy of 85 percent for 1995 was 
approximately equal to that of a guess based on prior probabilities, just as it was for 1994.
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PREDICTED 
0 1
0
ACTUAL
102 i 103
1 17 0 17
119 i 120
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11 ■
Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
1 1 0 0.869 0.131
14 1 0 0.884 0.116
17 1 0 0.856 0.144
19 1 0 0.878 0.122
23 1 0 0.855 0.145
27 1 0 0.879 0.121
43 1 0 0.865 0.135
46 1 0 0.887 0.113
48 1 0 0.890 0.110
50 1 0.482 0.518
56 1 0 0.706 0.294
86 1 0 0.872 0.128
88 1 0 0.844 0.156
90 1 0 0.934 0.066
98 1 0 0.896 0.104
106 1 0 0.851 0.149
111 1 0 0.854 0.146
115 1 0 0.837 0.163
1996 Results. The model did not perform much better in 1996, as shown in 
Table 19 and Table 20. The model misclassified 16 firms, most of which were group 1 
firms misidentified as belonging to group 0. This represents a classificatory accuracy of
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86.7 percent, which is slightly better than the 85.0 percent an educated speculation (based 
on prior probabilities) would yield.
4
PREDICTED 
0 1
ACTUAL
101 2
14 3
115
103
17
120
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ASAl<YSFS 1996
Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
3 1 0 0.676 0.324
4 1 0 0.597 0.403
6 1 0 0.947 0.053
25 1 0 0.972 0.028
32 1 0 0.734 0.266
36 1 0 0.915 0.085
38 1 0 0.863 0.137
41 1 0 0.888 0.112
52 1 0 0.606 0.394
61 1 0 0.847 0.153
63 0 1 0.415 0.585
69 0 1 0.265 0.735
74 1 0 0.900 0.100
76 1 0 0.859 0.141
80 1 0 0.929 0.071
94 1 0 0.918 0.082
1997 R esults. In 1997, the mode! misclassified 14 firms, with most being group
1 firms placed into group 0 by mistake. This was a slight improvement over the results in 
the first analysis. The classificatory accuracy of 88.2 percent is a little better than the 84.9
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percent accuracy that would be achieved by simply assuming that all the firms were no­
change firms, based on prior probabilities.
ACTUAL
0
1
^ v i '
.Yj..s. . „ •■ w >, 
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PREDICTED 
0 1
103 2
12 2
115
105
14
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SECTi11raa*
Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
10 1 0 0.955 0.045
28 1 0.021 0.979
31 1 0 0.921 0.079
52 1 0.480 0.520
54 1 0 0.806 0.194
58 1 0 0.945 0.055
64 1 0 0.950 0.050
72 1 0 0.936 0.064
82 1 0 0.947 0.053
92 1 0 0.948 0.052
101 1 0 0.809 0.191
108 1 0 0.829 0.171
113 1 0 0.950 0.050
119 1 0 0.934 0.066
These findings, just as those obtained using the full sample imply that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between financial weakness and OPEB reductions, nor 
is there one between the level of the OPEB liability and plan reductions. However, since 
individual variables in the model were found to have a statistically significant relationship 
with OPEB plan reductions, these results are questionable. Probably the most significant 
discovery in the second analysis was the slight improvement in the overall classificatory
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accuracy of the model when compared to that of a knowledgeable postulation that all firms 
belong to group 0. This is consistent with the slight decrease in the prior probabilities over 
those present in the first analysis. Still, given the significance of several variables, logic 
would dictate that there should be a larger gap between model’s accuracy and that of a 
biased selection than existed in either the first or second analysis. If the prior probabilities 
have been causing this inconsistency, a greater reduction in prior probabilities should 
widen the gap between the accuracy of a guess and that of the model. At this point, further 
analysis was deemed necessary. Accordingly, a third analysis was performed.
Results from the Third Stage of Data Analysis
In this third analysis, the entire group of change firms was taken and each change 
firm was matched to one of the no-change firms of similar size, using total assets as the 
proxy for size. By performing this analysis in such a manner, the prior probabilities were 
reduced to exactly .50 and .50, meaning that any firm taken at random from the sample 
had an equal chance of being from group 0 or group 1. So, by having prior probabilities 
resembling those of a coin toss, the results should not be confounded by an unbalanced 
data set. If the model still lacks classificatory power, it would help confirm what was found 
in the first two analyses. Conversely, if the model has considerably better classificatory 
ability than it did in the previous analyses, it would probably indicate that in both the full 
and systematically reduced samples, the prior probabilities were too extreme and had 
caused discriminant analysis to force observations into the dominant group.
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MANOVA tests were run for the two groups for each year. These means tests 
again showed that the variables for which there were differences between group means had 
statistical significance in the final models for each year.
Group means are shown for all variables in the model, including the lagged 
variables. The means tests for 1994 were as follows:
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j M B i a — i i i g
VARIABLE GROUP 0 (No-Chance) GROUP 1 (Change)
TD/TA94 0.2718475 0.3242922
NI/TA94 0.0469300 -0.0063800
OI/TA94 0.0823800 0.0410700
OCF/TA94 0.0964900 0.0634700
AP/TA94 0.0416200 0.0766300
CTD/TA94 -0.0216000 -0.0148000
CNI/TA94 0.0303400 0.0824600
COI/TA94 0.0232300 0.0265798
CCF/TA94 -0.0144000 -0.0111000
CAP/TA94 0.0018500 -0.1781697
INTI 94 0.0091490 0.0243500
INT294 1.0788860 2.1703890
INT394 0.5081432 1.9554040
INT494 0.7681257 1.2296800
INT594 0.0000761 0.0131000
INT694 0.1878021 -1.6241830
INT794 -0.0777000 -5.5966960
INT894 0.0052980 -1.8711020
1 LAGGED VARIABLES GROUP 0 (No-Chance) GROUP 1 (Chance)
TD/TA93 0.2934923 0.3391601
NI/TA93 0.0165900 -0.0888000
OI/TA93 0.0591400 0.0144900
OCF/TA93 0.1109234 0.0746400
APBO/TA93 0.0397700 0.2548060
INT193 0.0098330 0.1284548
INT293 0.4185559 -1.5203980
INT393* 1.0282240 -0.4533161
INT493 0.5885269 2.9597150
* Indicates a variable that was statistically significant in the model
Source: MANOVA Procedure
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For 1995, the group means were as follows:
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HRSSuiiM I— 1
VARIABLE GROUP 0 (No-Change! GROUP 1 (Change!
TD/TA95* 0.2094904 0.3299622
NI/TA95* 0.0720500 -0.0087800
OI/TA95 0.1013514 0.0325100
OCF/TA95 0.0979800 0.0764900
APBO/TA95 0.0435300 0.0584728
CTD/TA95 -0.0126000 -0.0067600
CNI/TA95 -0.0006830 -0.0313000
COI/TA95 -0.0069700 -0.0270000
CCF/TA95 -0.0051100 0.0048900
CAP/TA95 -0.0012000 0.0141400
INTI 95 0.0079740 0.0104582
INT295 0.6320230 0.9704812
INT395 0.3659950 1.2066320
INT495 0.4004364 -0.0773000
INT595 -0.0000375 -0.0010700
INT695 0.2589340 -1.9209480
INT795 -0.6968790 -1.4458150
INT895 -0.6387340 0.0677000
LAGGED VARIABLES GROUP 0 (No-Change! GROUP 1 (Change!
TD/TA94 0.2718475 0.3242922
NI/TA94 0.0469300 -0.0063800
OI/TA94 0.0823800 0.0410700
OCF/TA94 0.0964900 0.0634700
APBO/TA94 0.0416200 0.0766300
INT194 0.0091490 0.0243500
INT294 1.0788860 2.1703890
INT394 0.5081432 1.9554040
INT494 0.7681257 1.2296800
* Indicates a variable that was statistically significant in the model
Source: MANOVA Procedure
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VARIABLE GROUP 0 (No-Change) GROUP 1 (Change)
TD/TA96 0.2761801 0.4939735
NI/TA96 0.0599100 0.0097600
OI/TA96 0.0967700 0.0412800
OCF/TA96 0.1000350 0.0683700
APBO/TA96 0.0243900 0.0406700
CTD/TA96 -0.0262000 0.0297700
CNI/TA96 -0.0042100 -0.0071800
COI/TA96 -0.0096600 0.0097530
CCF/TA96 0.0078610 0.0448900
CAP/TA96 -0.0023300 -0.0057200
INTI 96* 0.0050280 0.0135400
INT296 0.4443824 0.1255991
INT396 0.1924495 -0.2780344
INT496 0.5213550 0.7796025
INT596 0.0007463 0.0009684
INT696 -0.0404000 0.0525300
INT796 -0.1128174 0.0678300
INT896 0.1494852 0.0035100
LAGGED VARIABLES GROUP 0 (No-Change) GROUP 1 (Change)
TD/TA95 0.2094904 0.3299622
NI/TA95 0.0720500 -0.0087800
OI/TA95* 0.1013514 0.0325100
OCF/TA95 0.0979800 0.0764900
APBO/TA95 0.0435300 0.0584728
INT195 0.0079740 0.0104582
INT295 0.6320230 0.9704812
INT395 0.3659950 1.2066320
INT495 0.4004364 -0.0773000
* Indicates a variable that was statistically significant in the model
Source: MANOVA Procedure
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For 1997, the group means were as follows:
— 118— — ia!
VARIABLE GROUP 0 INo-Chanse) GROUP 1 (Chanee)
TD/TA97 0.2761801 0.2616107
NI/TA97 0.0599100 0.0586300
OI/TA97 0.0967700 0.0704900
OCF/TA97 0.1000350 0.0726400
APBO/TA97 0.0243900 0.0551900
CTD/TA97* 0.0062310 -0.0783000
CNI/TA97 -0.0212000 0.0332200
COI/TA97 -0.0190000 0.0102800
CCF/TA97 -0.0242233 -0.0137000
CAP/TA97 -0.0022500 -0.0197000
INT197 0.0096440 0.0123500
INT297 -1.0681010 2.1231280
INT397 0.3582375 0.3028621
INT497 -0.3392735 0.7806534
INT597* -0.0000839 0.0045700
INT697 -1.0960050 0.3747548
INT797 0.0546900 0.5048344
INT897 -0.0302000 0.1767520
LAGGED VARIABLES GROUP 0 INo-Chanse) GROUP 1 (Chancel
TD/TA96 0.2742061 0.4939735
NI/TA96 0.0529400 0.0097600
OI/TA96 0.0885100 0.0412800
OCF/TA96 0.1079660 0.0683700
APBO/TA96* 0.0832400 0.0406700
INT196 0.0050280 0.0135400
INT296 0.4443824 0.1255991
INT396 0.1924495 -0.2780344
INT496 0.5213550 0.7796025
* Indicates a variable that was statistically significant in the model
Source: MANOVA Procedure
1994 Results. For 1994, the results were stronger than they were in the first two 
analyses. Five firms were misclassified (as shown in Table 29), so the model has a
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classificatory accuracy of 79.17 percent. This is considerably better than the accuracy of 
a guess, which in this case, would be exactly 50 percent. These results provide evidence 
that some of the model’s previous inability to classify firms in the first two analyses was 
due to extreme prior probabilities. In the third analysis, as in the first two, several variables 
were significant. This is consistent with the model possessing a significantly better 
classificatory accuracy than a mere guess.
The financial weakness variables were found not to be statistically significant at the 
.05 level, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1. There appears not to be 
a statistical relationship between the financial weakness variables and OPEB reduction 
decisions in 1994.
For hypothesis 2, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis, since the OPEB 
liability does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction 
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 3 is not rejected, since the change in the OPEB 
liability appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction 
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 4 is not rejected since the change in the financial 
weakness variables does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with 
OPEB reduction decisions.
However, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 5 is rejected, since the variable INT3 
is significant at the .05 level. The significance of INT3 provides evidence that the
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interaction between the level of cash flows in 1994 and the level of the OPEB liability (in 
the same year) may have influenced decisions to reduce OPEB plans in 1994.
The null hypothesis is not rejected in the case of hypothesis 6, since none of the 
second group of interaction variables is significant at the .05 level.
Ho Rejected?
Yes No
HI X
H2 X
H3 X
H4 X
H5 X
H6 X
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PREDICTED 
0 1
0 11 1 12
ACTUAL
1 4 8 12
15 9 24
*
Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
2 1 0 0.687 0.313
3 1 0 0.776 0.224
00 1 0 0.850 0.150
14 1 0 0.711 0.289
17 0 1 0.427 0.573
1995 Results. For 1995, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 is rejected, as there 
appears to be a statistical relationship between at least one of the financial weakness 
variables and OPEB reduction decisions. Specifically, NI/TA95 and TD/TA95 were 
statistically significant at the .05 level. The significance of NI/TA95 indicates that the level 
of net income in 1995 had some influence on OPEB reduction decisions made during that
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year. Since TD/TA95 was also significant, the debt level in 1995 appears to have had some 
influence on OPEB reduction decisions during the year.
For hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis is not rejected, since the OPEB liability 
appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction decisions.
The null hypothesis is not rejected for hypothesis 3, since the change in the OPEB 
liability appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction 
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 4 is not rejected since the change in the financial 
weakness variables does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with 
OPEB reduction decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 5 is also not rejected, since none of the first 
group of interaction variables are significant at the .05 level.
The null hypothesis is not rejected in the case of hypothesis 6, since none of the 
second group of interaction variables are significant at the .05 level
For 1995, the model’s classificatory accuracy was 75.0 percent, which is fairly 
good. There were eleven misclassified firms (see Table 32), but in contrast to the results 
obtained in the first two analyses, not all the misclassified firms were change firms 
misidentified as no-change firms.
Overall, the classificatory power of the model was slightly weaker for 1995. 
Although there were no variables found to be significant for 1995 in the first two analyses, 
two variables were significant in the third analysis.
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TH
A
URB STAGE OF 
VALYSft 1995
Ho Rejected? 
Yes No
HI X
H2 X
H3 X
H4 X
HS X
H6 X
l i l i i i i i
| | | | | i
UgPPPP
PREDICTED 
0 1
ACTUAL
0 15 4 19
1 7 12 19
22 16 38
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Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
1 1 0 0.534 0.466
9 1 0 0.545 0.455
12 1 0 0.692 0.308
18 0 1 0.374 0.626
24 0 1 0.471 0.529
27 1 0 0.742 0.258
29 1 0 0.655 0.345
32 1 0 0.700 0.300
33 1 0 0.613 0.387
35 0 1 0.407 0.593
38 0 1 0.464 0.536
1996 R esults. For 1996, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 is rejected, as there 
appears to be a statistical relationship between at least one of the financial weakness 
variables and OPEB reduction decisions. Specifically, OI/TA95 was statistically significant 
at the .05 level, which suggests that the level of operating income in 1995 had some 
influence on OPEB reduction decisions made in 1996.
For hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis is not rejected, since the OPEB liability 
appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction decisions.
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The null hypothesis is not rejected for hypothesis 3, since the change in the OPEB 
liability appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction 
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 4 is not rejected since the change in the financial 
weakness variables does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with 
OPEB reduction decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 5 was rejected since at least one of the first four 
interaction variables is significant at the .05 level. The significance of INTI 96 indicates 
that the interaction between the level of total debt to assets and the level of the OPEB 
liability had an influence on the decisions to reduce OPEB plans during the year.
The null hypothesis is not rejected in the case of hypothesis 6, since none of the 
second group of interaction variables is significant at the .05 level
Overall, the results for 1996 were slightly stronger. The model’s classificatory 
accuracy was 77.78 percent. There were eight misclassified firms (see Table 35).
Ho Rejected? 
Yes No
HI X
H2 X
H3 X
H4 X
H5 X
H6 X
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■ B I K U S I A M
H j ||j j ) I B m
PREDICTED
0 1
0 15 3 18
ACTUAL
1 5 13 18
20 16 36
«ss lit
Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
3 1 0 0.829 0.171
4 0 1 0.305 0.695
9 1 0 0.697 0.303
12 1 0 0.581 0.419
24 1 0 0.581 0.419
16 0 1 0.495 0.505
30 0 1 0.215 0.785
31 1 0 0.901 0.099
1997 Results. For 1997, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 is not rejected since 
none of the financial weakness variables were statistically significant at the .05 level. There
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
appears not to be a statistical relationship between the financial weakness variables and 
OPEB reduction decisions.
For hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis is not rejected, since the OPEB liability 
appears to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction decisions.
The significance of the APBO/TA96 variable indicates that the level of the OPEB 
liability as a percentage of total assets during 1996 appears to have had an influence on 
OPEB plan reduction decisions in 1997.
The null hypothesis is not rejected for hypothesis 3, since the change in the OPEB 
liability appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction 
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 4 is rejected since the change in at least one of 
the financial weakness variables appears to have a statistically significant relationship with 
OPEB reduction decisions. Since the CTD/TA97 variable was significant, there is evidence 
that the change in the total debt level between 1996 and 1997 may have influenced OPEB 
reduction decisions made in 1997.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis S is also not rejected, since none of the first 
group of interaction variables is significant at the .05 level.
The null hypothesis is rejected for hypothesis 6, since at least one of the second 
group of interaction variables is significant at the .05 level. The statistical significance of 
INT597 suggests that the interaction between the change in total debt between 1996 and
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1997 and the change in the OPEB liability during the same period influenced OPEB plan 
reductions during 1997.
Overall, the results for 1997 were similar to those in 1996 except for the fact that 
different variables were significant. The model’s classificatory accuracy again was 77.7S 
percent, which is fairly good. There were eight misclassified firms (see Table 38). 
Interestingly, the model classified more firms as change firms than no-change firms. This 
is in stark contrast with the results in the first two analyses. This provides further evidence 
that the extreme prior probabilities that existed with the first two stages of the analysis 
caused discriminant analysis to classify too many firms as no-change firms, based upon the 
unbalanced nature o f the sample in both cases.
■ * § § *  I
Ho Rejected? 
Yes No
HI X
H2 X
H3 X
H4 X
H5 X
H6 X
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fata#
PREDICTED
ACTUAL
18 18 36
Row Act Pred P(0) P(l)
2 1 0 0.906 0.094
3 0 I 0.313 0.687
11 1 0 0.539 0.461
16 0 1 0.481 0.519
20 0 1 0.420 0.580
23 1 0 0.577 0.423
24 1 0 0.724 0.276
25 0 1 0.430 0.570
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
Summary of Results from the Third 
Stage of Data Analysis
The overall findings in the third analysis were inconsistent with the first two steps 
in the data analysis. The discriminant analysis classified many more firms into the change 
group than it did in the first two analyses. This appears to indicate that the extreme prior 
probabilities in the first two stages of analysis rendered the model useless. In the third 
analysis, the model was found to have considerably better classificatory power. The results 
of this third analysis are much more reliable than those in the first two, so the conclusions 
in this study will be made based upon the findings in the third stage of analysis.
Based upon the results obtained in the third analysis, there appears to be a 
significant relationship between some of the financial weakness variables and OPEB plan 
reductions. Therefore, it appears that some of the OPEB plan reduction decisions during 
the 1994*97 period were influenced to some extent either by the level of some of these key 
variables or the changes in the levels of the variables from one year to the next. Also, it 
appears that there is a relationship between the level of the OPEB liability and plan 
reductions. This also provides evidence that there is at least a slight long-term effect 
associated with SFAS No. 106. One of the major concerns surrounding the passage of this 
statement was that disclosure of this liability might increase the likelihood that companies 
would reduce or terminate OPEB plans. Although evidence suggests strongly that this 
occurred with the adoption of SFAS No. 106, the statistical analysis in this study indicates 
that it has not been a particularly significant factor to date in the post-adoption period.
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However, the OPEB liability was most significant in 1997, the most recent year available. 
Future research should be able to determine whether this is the beginning of a pattern.
Another finding that was consistent in the three steps of data analysis was the lack 
of a clearly defined trend over the period examined. However, some year-to-year 
differences were found. The most interesting of these differences was the increased 
importance of the OPEB liability variables in 1997. Since no data after 1997 were 
available, it is uncertain whether this represents the beginning of a pattern. The justification 
for analyzing firms in separate years was that such separation was necessary to determine 
whether significant year-to-year differences existed or if a trend was evident. The existence 
of a trend or significant year-to-year differences would have a negative effect on the 
classificatory power of the model if all the changes were examined without regard to year. 
One last analysis was performed to test for this.
Results from the Fourth Stage of Data Analysis
In the fourth and final analysis, all the change firms were combined without regard 
to year and matched to the no-change firms identified in the third analysis. This yielded a 
sample of 131, of which 64 were change firms and 67 were no-change firms. For one firm, 
data were not available for one year. The analysis showed that two firms changed benefits 
in both 1994 and 1996. These facts explain the existence of only 64 change firms 
compared with 67 no-change firms. This brought the prior probabilities to .51 and .49 for 
groups 0 and 1, respectively. The results appear in Table 39.
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REGARD TOm m M m
PREDICTED 
0 1
0
ACTUAL
52 15 67
1 25 39 64
77 54 131
The results showed that the model had somewhat weaker classificatory power than 
that found in the third analysis. Although 54 firms were identified as change firms, a total 
of 40 firms (consisting of both change and no-change firms) were misclassified. This 
indicates that the model’s classificatory power is slightly less accurate when the year of 
change is not considered. Since 91 of the 131 firms were classified correctly, the model’s 
classificatory power was 69.5 percent, compared with 75.0 to 79.2 percent in the third 
analysis. Since the differences in classificatory accuracy were quite small, the results 
indicate that taking the different years into account failed to improve the model’s 
classificatory power significantly. The specific differences between years were not readily 
discemable, so it can be concluded that stratification by year, at least for the period 
covered in this study, was not necessary.
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Summary of Results
Here, aggregate findings suggested that there is a connection between OPEB 
liability levels and at least some of the OPEB reductions during the 1994-97 period. 
Statistical analysis appears to show a relationship between several of the financial 
weakness variables and some of the OPEB reductions experienced during this time.
These results, however, provide only limited evidence for a relationship between 
financial weakness and OPEB reductions. Such observations also provide only limited 
evidence for any connection between the levels of OPEB liability and subsequent OPEB 
reductions. Clearly the evidence is too weak to allow highly accurate classification of firms 
as either change or no-change firms using the variables examined in this study. However, 
since the model’s classificatory accuracy was better than chance, there appears to be some 
evidence linking financial weakness and the OPEB liability to some of the decisions to 
reduce postretirement benefits in the post-SFAS No. 106 adoption period. The results of 
this investigation also are somewhat inconsistent with those of prior studies of OPEB 
reductions and of those concerning pension plan reductions. These other inquiries, as 
found in Table 40, suggest that there was a significant connection between financial 
weakness and OPEB reductions as well as with pension plan reductions. For example, 
Mittelstaedt et al. (199S) determined that there was a statistically significant relationship 
between financial weakness and OPEB reduction decisions. In addition, Mittelstaedt 
(1989), Thomas (1989), and Stone (1987), all found financial weakness to be a key 
variable in explaining pension plan reductions. However, in this study these relationships
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were considerably weaker. The current research appears to be the first to examine OPEB 
reductions since the adoption of SFAS No. 106 and, therefore, no direct comparison 
between this investigation and others can be made.
^ 1 1
■
3—
STUDY AUTHOR YEAR FINDINGS
“A Financing Explanation 
for Overfunded Pension 
Plan Terminations.”
Stone, Maiy 1987 Stone found evidence that 
financial slack in the form of 
pension fund assets was more 
likely to be used when a firm is 
financially weaker.
“An Empirical Analysis of 
the Factors Underlying the 
Decision to Remove Excess 
Assets from Overfunded 
Pension Plans.”
Mittelstaedt, H. Fred 1989 Mittelstaedt determined that 
terminators tended to be 
significantly weaker financially 
than maintainers and that 
terminators were financially 
weaker three years prior to 
termination. Also, contractors 
(firms that reduced benefits 
rather than terminating them) 
were weaker than maintainers, 
but stronger than terminators.
“Why Do Firms Terminate 
Their Overfunded Pension 
Plans?”
Thomas, Jacob K. 1989 Thomas found that continued 
declines in available funds that 
exhaust the stock of preferred 
sources of slack were associated 
with pension plan terminations.
“SFAS No. 106 and benefit 
reductions in employer-
sponsored retiree health 
care plans.”
Mittelstaedt, H Fred, 
William D. Nichols, 
and Philip R. Regier.
1995 In examining OPEB reduction 
and termination decisions, the 
authors found support for the 
financial weakness hypothesis. 
The support, however, was not 
as strong as it was with the 
pension terminators or pension 
contractors reported by 
Mittelstaedt (1989) and Thomas 
(19891.
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In any case, results of this study show what would be logically expected. After all, 
there has been a tremendous reduction in the number of firms continuing to offer post 
retirement benefits since the adoption of SFAS No. 106. In fact, Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) 
found that many of them dropped OPEB coverage once this standard was adopted. It 
certainly would appear, therefore, that this circumstance "weeded out" many of the weaker 
firms, an assertion quite consistent with this study’s findings. In fact, if the majority of the 
weak firms had already stopped their OPEB coverage, it follows that by the end of 1993, 
relatively few of those weak firms were now still offering postretirement benefits.
This finding alone could help in explaining the small number of firms still offering 
such coverage. Furthermore, the tiny number of such weak firms might have had an effect 
on the explanatory power of the financial weakness variables used in this investigation. 
Also, the unusually strong economy during the period examined by this study could have 
contributed to the relative insignificance of the financial weakness variables. It does seem 
likely that, out of the sample of firms investigated, there were fewer financially weak 
companies than might have been present under weaker economic conditions. Inasmuch 
as the adoption of SFAS No. 106 demanded a major change in the accounting of 
postretirement benefits, it certainly is possible that the fundamental connection between 
these benefits and predictors of plan reductions could have changed. Many of the weak 
firms in the Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) study were not included in this study, since they had 
terminated OPEB benefits prior to 1994. This might help explain why financial weakness 
had a poorer predictive ability in this study than that found by Mittelstaedt et al. (1995). 
It is also possible that during the period Mittelstaedt et al. examined there was an
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interaction between financial weakness and the adoption of SFAS No. 106, which 
represents a relationship that does not exist in the post-adoption period. However, because 
systematic analysis revealed no other SFAS No. 106 studies in the post-adoption period 
that examined OPEB reductions, one cannot affirm these conclusions with other 
independent studies.
The relative weakness of the explanatory power of OPEB liability is not especially 
surprising since, as previously mentioned, the adoption of SFAS No. 106 greatly reduced 
the number of firms offering OPEBs. One of the concerns surrounding SFAS No. 106 was 
the possibility of a long-term effect. One of the questions concerned whether having to 
record OPEB liability might have led to increased OPEB reductions. It is quite possible, 
o f course, that the results o f this study indicate, simply, that the level o f this liability has 
a small negative long-term effect on OPEB coverage. In other words, the level o f the 
liability may be associated with a slightly increased likelihood of OPEB plan reductions. 
However, the period 1994-1997 represented the very first period occurring after the 
adoption of SFAS No. 106. In view of this, it would be premature to conclude that there 
is a long-term effect from use of this new accounting standard. Accordingly, further study 
will be necessary before such an assertion can be validated.
Limitations of the Final Study
One of the constraints of the pilot study was its small sample size. By using the 
entire group of firms offering postretirement benefits during the 1994-1997 period in the 
final study, that problem was addressed. However, due to the extremely small proportion
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of change firms to no-change firms in the sample, the prior probabilities were so extreme 
that the results from the first two stages of the analysis were invalidated. As a result, the 
sample had to be reduced to the point where there was a one-to-one ratio o f change to no­
change firms. Therefore, the conclusions in this study were based on the results obtained 
with a smaller sample than anticipated. Another limitation was the time period being used. 
Other methodologies, such as that used by Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) could not be used 
here, since they lagged some of the financial weakness variables three years. Nevertheless, 
as an experiment, the variables were lagged for three years for 1996 and 1997 in this study 
but they were found not to be statistically significant. Of course, fundamental relationships 
could have changed since the adoption of SFAS No. 106.
It seems apparent, however, that the small number of firms offering OPEB benefits 
in comparison with the total number is significant by itself. This supports the assumption 
that adoption of SFAS No. 106 did have an effect on subsequent decisions to reduce or 
eliminate postretirement benefits.
Conclusions Based Upon Results of Final Study
There does appear to be a relationship between financial weakness and levels of 
OPEB liability and the subsequent reduction of postretirement benefits. At this juncture, 
connections found in this inquiry were too weak to be of great classificatory value, but the 
results obtained do suggest the need for further research. It is, of course, quite possible 
that the relationship between financial weakness and OPEB reductions changed from what 
they were prior to as well as during the adoption of SFAS No. 106. Nevertheless, the
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findings presented here are clearly at variance with those developed by prior investigations. 
In this regard, it is significantly relevant to point out that prior research occurred during 
either the pre-adoption or the adoption period of SFAS No. 106. Since the adoption of 
that standard produced such a radical change in the accounting of postretirement benefits, 
it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the fundamental relationship between OPEB 
reductions and key variables might have changed. In any case, it is clear that further study 
is needed.
Recommendations for Future Research
This study has revealed several issues which appear appropriate for further inquiry. 
Several have already become apparent. Ultimately, the somewhat inconclusive results 
offered here imply that other methodologies ought to be explored. Some further 
possibilities have become evident as a result. For example, does a relationship really exist 
between the adoption date, the adoption method, and the benefit cuts which subsequently 
occurred? Smith, in 1994, did find that the early adoption of SFAS No. 106 was 
associated with financial weakness. It is possible, therefore, that later adoption, i.e., 
adoption in the fiscal year following December 15,1992, could be used as a proxy for pre- 
SFAS No. 106 financial weakness.
The results of the current study certainly have provided evidence that post-SFAS 
No. 106 adoption financial weakness and the OPEB liability level may not be as strong 
predictors of OPEB reductions as they were prior to the adoption of the accounting 
standard.
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It is possible that the widely varying health care cost rate increases have led to 
diminished OPEB liability predictive power. Although SFAS No. 106 does require firms 
to predict rates at which they feel health care costs will increase, they give no specific 
parameters within which such estimates must fall. Understandably, then, there is a wide 
variation in the assumptions about cost increases by these firms. Furthermore, since OPEB 
liability recorded on the company's balance sheets is predicated upon health care cost 
assumptions, such potential liabilities could be significantly under- or over-stated. Thus, 
if all the OPEB liability figures now are recalculated for each firm using one standard rate, 
e.g., 6 percent, the OPEB liability figures might be considerably better predictors ofbenefit 
plan reductions. Finally, if, after recalculating such figures, the variable still fails to predict 
benefit cuts accurately, the suggestion that there is no long-term effect o f SFAS No. 106 
would be reinforced considerably. Since SFAS No. 106 requires firms to disclose how 
much a one percentage point would increase or decrease the health care cost o f OPEB 
liability, such recalculations can be made.
Another option might be to conduct surveys to determine why firms that reduced 
OPEB plans did so in the first place. With so few firms actually making reduction 
decisions, however, the response rate would have to be unusually high in order to obtain 
truly meaningful results.
Final Comments
One of the major contributions provided by this study is the development of the 
groundwork for the future study of postretirement benefits in the post-SFAS No. 106
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adoption era. Furthermore, this inquiry seems to represent the first attempt to have been 
made to both identify and examine the relationship between the OPEB liability and 
postretirement benefit cuts. Additionally, it would appear to be the first one to investigate 
the relationship between financial weakness and postretirement benefit cuts experienced 
in this same post-SFAS No. 106 adoption period.
Sample of Firms
AAR CORP*
ABBOTT LABORATORIES
ACME METALS INC
AFLAC INC
AGWAY INC
AH MANSON H F & CO
AIR & WATER TECHNOLOGIES 
CORP*
AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC
AIRBORNE FREIGHT CORP
AIRTOUCH COMMUNICATIONS 
INC
ALASKA AIR GROUP INC 
ALBANY INTERNATIONAL CORP 
ALBERTSONS INC 
ALEXANDER & BALDWIN INC 
ALEXANDERS INC*
ALLEGHANY CORP 
ALLERGAN INC 
ALLIED PRODUCTS CORP 
ALLIED SIGNAL INC 
ALLTEL CORP 
AMAX GOLD INC
AMC ENTERTAINMENT INC 
AMCAST INDUSTRIAL CORP 
AMERCO
AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
AMERICAN BUSINESS 
PRODUCTS INC*
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO
AMERICAN GENERAL CORP
AMERICAN GREETINGS CORP
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS 
CORP
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL 
GROUP INC*
AMERICAN STANDARD INC
AMERICAN STORES CO
AMERITECH CORP
AMERON INTERNATIONAL 
CORP
AMOCO CORP 
AMP INC
AMPCO PITTSBURGH CORP* 
AMR CORP
ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP 
ANR PIPELINE CO
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AON CORP 
APPLIED POWER INC 
AQUARION CO
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO 
ARCO CHEMICAL CO 
ARISTAR INC*
ARKANSAS BEST CORP 
ARMCOINC
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES 
INC
ARVIN INDUSTRIES INC
ASARCOINC
ASHLAND OIL INC
ASSOCIATES CORPORATION OF 
NORTH AMERICA
ASTEC INDUSTRIES INC
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO
ATMOS ENERGY CO
AVATAR HOLDINGS INC
AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES INC
AVERY DENNISON CORP
AVON PRODUCTS INC
BAKER HUGHES INC
BALDWIN TECHNOLOGY CO INC
BALL CORP
BANDAG INC
BARD C R INC
BARNES GROUP INC
BATTLE MOUNTAIN GOLD CO
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC
BECKMAN INSTRUMENTS INC
BECTON DICKINSON & CO
BELL ATLANTIC CORP
BELLSOUTH CORP
BEMIS CO INC
BERLITZ INTERNATIONAL INC 
BETHLEHEM STEEL CORP 
BLACK & DECKER CORP 
BLOCK DRUG CO INC 
BLOUNT INC 
BMC INDUSTRIES INC 
BOISE CASCADE CORP 
BORDEN INC 
BOWATER INC 
BRADY W H  INC 
BRIGGS & STRATTON CORP 
BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO 
BROWN FORMAN CORP 
BROWN GROUP INC 
BRUNSWICK CORP 
BRUSH WELLMAN INC 
BULOVA CORP*
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS 
INC
BURLINGTON NORTHERN 
RAILROAD CO
CABOT CORP
CABOT OIL & GAS CORP*
CADMUS COMMUNICATIONS 
CORP
CALMAT CO
CAMBREX CORP
CAMPBELL SOUP CO
CAROLINA TELEPHONE & 
TELEGRAPH CO
CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY 
CORP
CARTER WALLACE INC 
CASCADE CORP
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CASTLE A & M CO
CATERPILLAR INC
CENTRAL NEWSPAPERS INC
CENTURY TELEPHONE 
ENTERPRISES INC
CERIDIAN CORP
CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL 
CORP
CHATTEM INC 
CHESAPEAKE CORP*
CHEVRON CORP 
CHITTENDEN CORP 
CHRYSLER CORP 
CHUBB CORP
CHURCH & DWIGHT CO INC 
CIGNA CORP 
CILCORP INC 
CINCINNATI BELL INC 
CINCINNATI MILACRON INC 
CINERGY CORP 
CIT GROUP INC 
CITICORP 
CLARCORINC
CLARK REFINING & MARKETING 
INC
CLEVELAND CLIFFS INC 
CLOROX CO 
CAN FINANCIAL CORP 
COASTAL CORP 
COCA COLA CO 
COLGATE POLMOLIVE CO 
COLTEC INDUSTRIES INC 
COMMERCIAL INTERTECH CORP 
COMSAT CORP*
CONAGRA INC
CONE MILLS CORP
CONESTOGA ENTERPRISES INC
CONSECO INC*
CONSOLIDATED PAPERS INC
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP
CONSOLIDATED TOMOKA 
LAND CO
COOPER INDUSTRIES INC 
COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO 
ADOLPH COORS CO*
CORE STATES FINANCIAL CORP 
CORNING INC 
CRANE CO
CROMPTON & KNOWLES CORP
CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM 
CORP
CROWN CORK & SEAL CO INC 
CTS CORP
CURTICE BURNS FOODS INC 
CURTISS WRIGHT CORP* 
CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO 
DANA CORP 
DATA GENERAL CORP 
DEAN FOODS CO*
DEERE & CO 
DELTA AIR LINES INC 
DELUXE CORP 
DETREX CORP 
DIAL CORP 
DIEBOLD INC
DOLE FOOD COMPANY INC 
DOMINION RESOURCES INC 
R R DONNELLEY & SONS CO 
DONNELLY CORP
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DOW CHEMICAL CO*
DOW JONES & CO INC
DPLINC
DRAVO CORP
DRESSER INDUSTRIES INC*
DUN & BRADSTREET CORP* 
DUPONT E I D E  NEMOURS & CO 
EASTMAN KODAK CO 
EATON CORP 
ECOLAB INC
EDISON BROTHERS STORES INC 
EDO CORP*
EC&GINC
EMC INSURANCE GROUP INC 
ENGELHARD CORP 
ENSERCH CORP 
ENVTRODYNE INDUSTRIES INC 
EQUIFAX INC
EQUITABLE RESOURCES INC* 
ETHYL CORP 
ETOWN CORP 
EXCEL INDUSTRIES INC 
EXIDE CORP 
FAIRCHILD CORP 
FARMER BROTHERS CO 
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP 
FEDERAL MOGUL CORP 
FEDERAL SIGNAL CORP 
FERRO CORP 
FIN A INC
FINOVA GROUP INC 
FIRST BRANDS CORP 
FLEMING COMPANIES INC 
FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES INC
FLUOR CORP 
FMC CORP*
FOODARAMA SUPERMARKETS 
INC
FORD MOTOR CO
FOREST OIL CORP
FOSTER WHEELER CORP
FREEPORT MCMORAN COPPER 
& GOLD INC
FRONTIER CORP*
H B  FULLER CO
ARTHUR GALLAGHER & CO
GANNETT CO INC
GATX CORP
GEHLCO
GENCORP INC
GENERAL AMERICAN TRANS­
PORTATION CORP
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO
GENERAL MILLS INC
GENERAL SIGNAL CORP
GENESCO INC
GENICOM CORP
GENRAD INC
GEORGIA PACIFIC CORP
GIBSON GREETINGS INC
GILLETTE CO
GLATFELTER P H CO
GLEASON CORP
GLOBAL MARINE INC
GOLD KIST INC
GOODRICH B F CO
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO
GORMAN RUPP CO
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GRACOINC
GRAINGER W W  INC
GRAND UNION CO
GRAYBAR ELECTRIC CO INC
GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA 
CO INC
GTE COR?
HALLIBURTON CO
HANCOCK FABRICS INC
HANDY & HARMAN
HANNA M A CO
HANNAFORD BROTHERS CO
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HARLAND JOHN H CO
HARLEY DAVIDSON INC
HARSCO CORP*
HASBRO INC
HECLA MINING CO
HEINZ H J CO*
HELLER FINANCIAL INC
HERCULES INC
HERTZ CORP
HEXCEL CORP
HON INDUSTRIES INC
HONEYWELL INC
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO*
HOUSTON INDUSTRIES INC
HUBBELL INC
HUFFY CORP
ICF KAISER INTERNATIONAL INC 
IDEX CORP 
IES INDUSTRIES 
ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC 
IMO INDUSTRIES INC*
INGERSOLL RAND CO
INLAND STEEL CO
INTERLAKE CORP*
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MACHINES CORP
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS & 
FRAGRANCES INC
INTERNATIONAL MULTIFOODS 
CORP*
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF 
COMPANIES INC
INTERSTATE BAKERIES CORP
JEFFERSON PILOT CORP
JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORP
JOHNSON & JOHNSON
JOSTENS INC
JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS
JPS TEXTILE GROUP INC
KN ENERGY INC
K & F INDUSTRIES INC
KAISER ALUMINUM & 
CHEMICAL CORP*
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN 
INDUSTRIES INC
KATY INDUSTRIES INC
KAYDON CORP
KELLOGG CO
KENNAMETAL INC*
KERR MCGEE CORP
KIMBERLY CLARK CORP
KIRBY CORP
KNIGHT RIDDER INC
KOLLMORGEN CORP
KROGER CO
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LADD FURNITURE INC*
LAFARGE CORP 
LANCASTER COLONY CORP 
LANCE INC 
LEE SARA CORP 
LEHMAN BROTHERS INC 
LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP* 
LILLY ELI & CO 
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP 
LITTON INDUSTRIES INC 
LOEWS CORP
LONE STAR INDUSTRIES INC* 
LONE STAR TECHNOLOGIES INC 
LONGVIEW FIBRE CO 
LUBRIZOL CORP
LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL CO
MALLINCKRODT INC
MANITOWOC CO INC
MARK IV INDUSTRIES INC
MARSH & MC LENNAN 
COMPANIES INC
MARSH SUPERMARKETS INC
MASCO CORP
MATTEL INC
MAUI LAND & PINEAPPLE CO INC* 
MAXXAM GROUP INC*
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO 
MC CORMICK & CO INC*
MC DERMOTT INC*
MC GRAW HILL COMPANIES INC 
MDU RESOURCES GROUP INC 
MEAD CORP 
MEDIA GENERAL INC 
MERCK & CO INC
MEREDITH CORP
MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC
MEYER FRED INC
MILLER HERMAN INC*
MILLIPORE CORP
MINNESOTA MINING & 
MANUFACTURING CO
MITCHELL ENERGY & 
DEVELOPMENT CORP
MOBIL CORP
MOLEX INC
MONSANTO CO
MONTGOMERY WARD 
HOLDING CORP*
MOOG INC
MOORE BENJAMIN & CO 
JP MORGAN & CO INC 
MORRISON KNUDSON CORP 
MUELLER INDUSTRIES INC 
MURPHY OIL CORP 
NACCO INDUSTRIES INC* 
NALCO CHEMICAL CO 
NASH FINCH CO 
NASHUA CORP*
NATIONAL GAS & OIL CO 
NATIONAL STANDARD CO 
NATIONAL STEEL CORP 
NAVISTAR FINANCIAL CORP 
NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE CO 
NCH CORP
NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP INC
NEW ENGLAND BUSINESS 
SERVICE INC
NEW JERSEY RESOURCES CORP 
NEW YORK TIMES CO
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NEWELL CO 
NEWMONT GOLD CO 
NICOR INC
NIPSCO INDUSTRIES INC 
NL INDUSTRIES INC 
NOBLE AFFILIATES INC 
NOLAND CO
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP
NORTHUP GRUMMAN CORP
NORTHWESTERN STEEL & WIRE 
CO
NUICORP
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP
OGDEN CORP
OGLEB AY NORTON CO
OHIO BELL TELEPHONE CO
OLIN CORP
ONEIDA LTD
ONEOK INC
ORANGE & ROCKLANDS 
UTILITIES INC
OREGON STEEL MILLS INC
ORION CAPITAL CORP
ORYX ENERGY CO
OSHKOSH B'GOSH INC
OSHKOSH TRUCK CORP
O' SULLIVAN CORP
OUTBOARD MARINE CORP*
OWENS & MINOR INC*
OWENS ILLINOIS INC
PACCAR INC
PACIFIC BELL
PACIFIC ENTERPRISES INC
PACIFIC LUMBER CO
PACIFICORP
PARK OHIO INDUSTRIES INC
PARKER HANNIFIN CORP
PAYLESS CASHWAYS INC*
PENN VIRGINIA CORP
PENNSYLVANIA ENTERPRISES 
INC
PENNZOIL CO 
PENT AIR INC 
PEPSICO INC 
PERKIN ELMER CORP 
PFIZER INC*
PHELPS DODGE CORP 
PHHCORP
PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES INC
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO
PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL CORP
PIONEER HI BRED INTER­
NATIONAL INC
PITNEY BOWES INC*
PITTSTONCO
POGO PRODUCING INC
POTLATCH CORP
PPG INDUSTRIES INC
PRECISION CASTPARTS CORP
PREMARK INTERNATIONAL INC
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO
PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS INC
PUERTO RICAN CEMENT CO INC
PULITZER PUBLISHING CO
QUAKER CHEMICAL CORP
QUAKER OATS CO
QUAKER STATE CORP
QUANEX CORP
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QUESTAR CORP 
RALPH'S GROCERY CO 
RALSTON PURINA CO 
RAYCHEM CORP*
RAYONIER INC
READERS DIGEST ASSOCIATION 
INC
REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS CO
REYNOLDS METALS CO
RIGGS NATIONAL CORP
RJR NABISCO INC
RMI TITANIUM CO
ROANOKE ELECTRIC STEEL CORP
ROBERTSON CECO CORP*
ROCHESTER & PITTSBURGH COAL 
CO
ROGERS CORP 
ROHM & HAAS CO 
ROSES HOLDINGS INC*
ROUSE CO
ROWAN COMPANIES INC
RPM INC*
RUBBERMAID INC
RYDER SYSTEM INC
SAFECO CORP
SAFEWAY INC*
SALOMON SMITH BARNEY 
HOLDINGS INC
SAVANNAH FOODS & INDUSTRIES 
INC
SCANACORP
SCHERER RP CORP
SCHERING PLOUGH CORP
SCHULMAN A INC
SCOTTS CO
SEARS ROEBUCK & CO* 
SEQUACORP 
SHELL OIL CO 
SHERWIN WILLIAMS CO 
SIGMA ALDRICH CORP 
SILGAN HOLDINGS INC 
SJW CORP 
SMITH AO CORP*
SMITH CORONA CORP*
SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC 
SMUCKER JM CO 
SNAP ON INC 
SONAT INC
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO
SOUTH JERSEY INDUSTRIES INC
SOUTHDOWN INC
SOUTHLAND CORP
SOUTHWESTERN BELL 
TELEPHONE CO
SPIEGEL INC
SPRINGS INDUSTRIES INC 
SPRINT CORP 
SPS TECHNOLOGIES INC 
SPX CORP*
STANDARD COMMERCIAL CORP
STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS 
INC
STANDARD PRODUCTS CO
STANDARD REGISTER CO
STANDEX INTERNATIONAL 
CORP
STANLEY FURNITURE CO INC 
STANLEY WORKS 
STARRETT L S CO
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STERLING CHEMICAL HOLDINGS 
INC
STERLING FINANCIAL CORP
STERLING SOFTWARE INC*
STEWART & STEVENSON 
SERVICES INC
STOKELY VAN CAMP INC
STOLELY USA INC*
STONE CONTAINER CORP
SUN CO INC
SUNDSTRAND CORP*
SUPERMARKETS GENERAL 
HOLDINGS CORP*
SUPER VALU INC
SWANK INC
SYSCO CORP
TECUMSEH PRODUCTS CO 
TEKTRONIX INC*
TELEFLEX INC
TELEPHONE & DATA SYSTEMS 
INC
TEMPLE INLAND INC 
TENNANT CO 
TENNECO INC
TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE CO 
TEREX CORP*
TESORO PETROLEUM CORP 
TEXACO INC
TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION CORP* 
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 
TEXTRON INC 
THIOKOL CORP 
THOMAS & BETTS CORP 
THOMAS INDUSTRIES INC 
TIDEWATER INC
TIFFANY & CO 
TIMES MIRROR CO 
TIMKEN CO 
TJX COMPANIES INC 
TNP ENTERPRISES INC 
TODD SHIPYARDS CORP 
TOKHEIM CORP 
TORCHMARK CORP 
TOSCO CORP
TRANSTECHNOLOGY CORP* 
TRAVELERS GROUP INC 
TREDEGAR INDUSTRIES INC 
TRIBUNE CO 
TULTEX CORP 
TURNER CORP
U HAUL INTERNATIONAL INC
US WEST COMMUNICATIONS 
INC
UAL CORP
UNION CAMP CORP
UNION PACIFIC CORP
UNION TEXAS PETROLEUM 
HOLDINGS INC
UNISYS CORP
UNITED AIR LINES INC
UNITED COMPANIES 
FINANCIAL CORP
UNITED ILLUMINATING CO
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF 
AMERICA INC
UNITED STATIONERS INC*
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP
UNITIL CORP
UNIVERSAL CORP
UNIVERSAL FOODS CORP
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UNOCAL CORP
UNUMCORP
US AIRWAYS GROUP INC
US WEST INC
USF&G CORP
VALSPAR CORP
VARCO INTERNATIONAL INC
VALERO ENERGY CORP
VARLEN CORP
VIACOM INC
VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC
VONS COMPANIES INC
VULCAN MATERIALS INC
WALBRO CORP
WALGREEN CO
WARNACO GROUP INC
WARNER LAMBERT CO
WASHINGTON POST CO
WEIRTON STEEL CORP
WESTERN RESOURCES INC
WESTMORELAND COAL CO*
WEYERHAEUSER CO
WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES 
INC
WHIRLPOOL CORP 
WHITMAN CORP 
WHXCORP 
WICORINC*
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES INC 
WILLIAMS COMPANIES INC 
WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES INC 
WISCONSIN BELL INC 
WITCO CORP
WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE INC
WOODWARD GOVERNOR CO 
WPL HOLDINGS INC 
WRIGLEY WILLIAM JR CO 
WYMAN GORDON CO 
WYNNS INTERNATIONAL INC 
XEROX CORP
* Decreased or terminated OPEBs 
during the period examined
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Akresh, Murray S., Barbara S. Bald, and Harold Denker, Lee E. Launer, Teresa A. 
McKenna, and Richard J. Poccia. “Retiree Health Care Benefits.” Management 
Accounting 12 (April 1991): 36-38.
Amir, Eli. “The Market Valuation of Accounting Information: The Case of Postretirement 
Benefits Other than Pensions.” The Accounting Review 68 (October 1993): 703-24.
________. “The Effect of Accounting Aggregation on the Value-Relevance of Financial
Disclosures: The Case of SFAS No. 106.” The Accounting Review 71 (October
1996): 573-90.
Amir, Eli, and Joshua Livnat. “Multiperiod Analysis of Adoption Motives: The case of 
SFAS No. 106.” The Accounting Review 71 (October 1996): 539-53.
Amir, Eli and Amir Ziv. "Recognition, Disclosure, or Delay: Timing the Adoption of SFAS 
No. 106." Journal o f Accounting Research 35 (Spring 1997): 61-81.
Amoroso, Vincent, and Brian Cumberland. “Termination of Retiree Health Benefits.” The 
Tax Advisor 26 (June 1995): 330-31.
Askren, Barbara. “Market Valuation of Postemployment Benefits Other than Pensions.” 
Ph.D. diss., Oklahoma State University, 1991.
Baker, C. Richard, and Rick Stephan Hayes. “The Negative Effect of an Accounting 
Standard on Employee Welfare: The Case of McDonnell Douglas Corporation and 
FASB 106 ."Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 8 (September 1995): 12-33.
Beaver, William H. “Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure.” Journal o f Accounting 
Research 4, Supplement (1966): 71-111.
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
120
________ . “The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements.” Journal o f
Accounting Research 6, Supplement (1968): 67-92.
________ . “The Time Series Behavior of Earnings.” Journal of Accounting Research 8,
Supplement (1970): 62-99.
Benovitz, Dave. “What Can Be Done About Postretirement Medical Liabilities?” Pension 
World 26 (April 1990): 28-30.
Berton, Lee. “FASB Rule on Retiree to Cause Furor.” Wall Street Journal, 9 February 
1989, A2.
Bisgay, Louis. “More on Postretirement Benefits.” Management Accounting 72 (March 
1991): 54.
Brotman, Billie Ann. “Postretirement Healthcare Benefit Rules Require Careful Study.” 
Healthcare Financial Management 48 (March 1994): 66.
Casey, Cornelius, and Norman Bartczak. “Using Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict 
Financial Distress: Some Extensions.” Journal of Accounting Research 23 (Spring 
1985): 384-401.
Chen, Kung H., and Thomas A. Shimerda. “An Empirical Analysis of Useful Financial 
Ratios.” Financial Management (Spring 1981): 51-60.
Cheney, Glenn Alan. “OPEB Impact Study.” Journal o f Accountancy 168 (August 1989): 
15-18.
Cocco, Anthony F., Daniel M. Ivancevich, Glenn A. Vent, and John C. Zimmerman. “FASB 
106’s Deferred Tax Implications: FASB Statement No. 109 Adds Another Wrinkle 
to Accounting for Postretirement Benefits.” Journal o f Accountancy 178 (October
1994): 89-91.
Cohen, Joel. “Accounting for Tomorrow’s Liabilities Today.” Benefits Canada 21 
December 1997): 69-76.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
Collins, Daniel W., and Michael S. Rozeoff, and Dan S. Dhaliwal. "The Economic 
Determinants of the Market Reaction to Proposed Mandatory Accounting Changes 
in The Oil and Gas Industry: A Cross-Sectional Analysis." Journal o f Accounting 
and Economics 3 (March 1981): 37-71.
Collins, Stephen H. “Companies Warned to Prepare for OPEB Fallout.” The Practical 
Accountant 24 (February 1991): 14-15.
Companies to Take FAS 106 Charges.” Employee Benefit Plan Review 46 (February 1992): 
42.
Connelly, Mary, Phil Frame, and Kathy Jackson. “Big 3 Must Book Huge Losses: Retirees’ 
Health-care Costs to Slash Equity by Billions.” Automotive News, 4 November 
1991, 1.
“Cooper Ends Retiree Medical, Saves Millions.” Employee Benefit Plan Review 48 (August 
1993): 14.
“Court Says Firm Can Alter Retiree Health Benefit Plans.” Medical Benefits 6 (30 January 
1989). 3.
Cross, Mark L., Steven M. Flory, and Thomas J. Phillips, Jr. “Implications of the FASB 
Proposal for Accruing Postretirement Health Care Benefits.” Benefits Quarterly 5 
(July 1989): 16-20.
Cross, Mark L., Steven M. Flory, and Thomas J. Phillips, Jr. “FASB Proposal Targets 
Retiree Health Care Benefits.” Risk Management 37 (December 1990): 47-49.
Daniels, Craig E., and Janet D. Daniels. “Retiree Health Care: A Ticking Bomb.” AGB 
Reports 34 (March 1992): 17.
Deakin, Edward B. “A Discriminant Analysis o f Predictors of Business Failures.” Journal 
o f Accounting Research 10 (Spring 1972): 167-79.
________. “Distributions of Financial Accounting Ratios: Some Empirical Evidence.” 77»e
Accounting Review 51 (January 1976): 90-96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
Dhaliwal, Dan S. “The Effects of the Firm’s Capital Structure on the Choice of Accounting 
Methods.” The Accounting Review 55 (January 1980): 78-84.
Dodson, Nita J., “About Accounting: Postretirement Benefits: Did FASB Pull the Plug?" 
Today’s CPA 18 (March 1993): 10.
Duff, David A., and Laura A. Taylor. “Postretirement Welfare Benefits: A New Look at 
Old Commitments.” Compensation and Benefits Review 21 (September 1989): 17- 
28.
Duggan, T. Patrick “A Turning Point for Benefits: Companies Are Moving Quickly to 
Calculate Their Liabilities in the Wake of the FASB Decision.” Best’s Review 91 
(December 1990): 18.
Duke, Joanne C., and Herbert G. Hunt III. “An Empirical Examination of Debt Covenant 
Restrictions and Accounting-Related Debt Proxies.” Journal o f Accounting and 
Economics 12 (January 1990): 45-63.
Durgin, Hillary. “Firms Take One-Time Hit on FAS 106.” Pensions and Investments 20 (17 
February 1992): 3.
Elgin, Peggie R. “HMO Risk Contracts Help Employers Cut Retiree Medical Costs.” 
Corporate Cashflow Magazine 16 (June 1995): 14.
“Employers Adapt to Retiree Health Increases Through Redesign of Benefits.” Employee 
Benefit Plan Review 47 (December 1992): 47-49.
Espahbodi, Hassan, Elizabeth Strock, and Hassan Tehranian. “Impact on Equity Prices of 
Pronouncements Related to Nonpension Postretirement Benefits.” Journal o f 
Accounting and Economics 14 (December 1991): 45-63.
“Facing Deadline, Businesses Are Shifting More Costs to Retirees.” Business and Health 
11 (March 1993). 18.
"FAS 106: Firms Wait, Costs to Rise." Employee Benefit Plan Review 41 (January 1993): 
50-51.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
123
“FAS 106 Survey: Bad News for Bottom Lines.” HR Focus 69 (August 1992): 19.
“FASB Rule to Cut Corporate Earnings.” Business Insurance, 19 September 1988, 32.
Financial Accounting Standards Board. Disclosure o f Pension and Other Post-Retirement 
Benefit Information. Exposure Draft. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, July 12, 1979.
________. Employers’ Accounting for Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits.
Discussion Memorandum. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, February 19, 1981.
________. “Discussion Memorandum Issued on Employers’ Pension Cost.” Status Report
No. 112,1-2. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, March 
10, 1981.
________. Employers’ Accounting for Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits.
Preliminary Views. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
November 1982.
________. Employers’ Accounting for Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits.
Discussion Memorandum. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, April 19, 1983.
________. “Highlights of First Quarter 1984.” Status Report No. 156, 1. Stamford,
Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, April 6, 1984.
________. Disclosure o f Postretirement Health Care and Life Insurance Benefits.
Exposure Draft. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
July 3, 1984.
________. “Exposure Draft Would Require Disclosures of Certain Postretirement
Benefits.” Status Report No. 159,1-2. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, August 20, 1984.
________. Disclosure o f Postretirement Health Care and Life Insurance Benefits.
Statement o f Financial Accounting Standards No. 81. Stamford, Connecticut: 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, November, 1984.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
 . “Statement Issued on Postretirement Health Care and Life Insurance Benefits.”
Status Report No. 163,1-2. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, December 31, 1984.
 . “Background on Board Agenda Projects.” Status Report No. 168,6. Stamford,
Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, July 10, 1985.
 . “Background on Board Agenda Projects.” Status Report No. 170,6. Stamford,
Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, October 8, 1985.
 . “Employers' Accounting for Pensions. Statement o f Financial Accounting
Standards No. 87. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
December, 1985.
 . “Background on Board Agenda Projects.” Status Report No. 174,5. Stamford,
Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, April 7, 1986.
 . “Changes to Timetable in Last Quarter’s Plan.” Status Report No. 180, 1.
Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, October 3, 1986.
 . “Background on Board Agenda Projects.” Status Report No. 184,7. Stamford,
Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, January 20, 1987.
 . “Background on Board Agenda Projects.” Status Report No. 185,7. Stamford,
Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, April 7,1987.
 . Accounting for a Change in Method o f Accounting for Certain Postretirement
Benefits. Technical Bulletin No. 87-1. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, April 9, 1987.
 . “Background on Board Agenda Projects.” Status Report No. 189, 7-8.
Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, October 13, 1987.
 . “Background on Board Agenda Projects.” Status Report No. 193,1. Stamford,
Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, April 11, 1988.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
________ . “Changes to Timetable in Last Quarter’s Plan.” Status Report No. 197, 1.
Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, October 11, 19S8.
________ . “Changes to Timetable in Last Quarter’s Plan.” Status Report No. 180, 1.
Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, October 3, 1986.
________ . Employers ’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions.
Exposure Draft. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
February 14, 1989.
________ . Employers ’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions.
Statement o f Financial Accounting Standards No. 106. Stamford, Connecticut: 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, December, 1990.
________ . “OPEB Statement Issued by Unanimous Vote.” Status Report No. 217,
Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, February 8, 1991.
________ . Employers ’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits. Statement o f Financial
Accounting Standards No. 112. Stamford, Connecticut: Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, November, 1992.
Fink, Ronald. “Scare Tactics: The Impact of New Accounting Rules for Health-Care 
Benefits May Not Be Apocalyptic After All.” Financial World 9 (June 1992): 74- 
75.
Francis, Jere R. and Sara Ann Reiter. “Determinants of Corporate Pension Funding 
Strategy.” Journal o f Accounting and Economics 9 (March 1987): 35-59.
“Future o f Retiree Health Benefits in Doubt.” Employee Benefit Plan Review 48 (August 
1993): 18.
Garland, Susan. “Bitter Choice: Broken Promises or Broken Budgets.” Business Week, 10 
December 1990,34.
Gujarathi, Mahendra R., and Robert E. Hoskin. “Evidence of Earnings Management the 
Early Adopters of SFAS 96.” Accounting Horizons 6 (December 1992): 18-31.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
Grossman, Steven D., Steven M. Flory, and Thomas J. Phillips, Jr. “Booking Your 
Promises: Accounting for Postemployment Benefits.” The Woman CPA 51 (October 
1989): 10-13.
Gunsch, Dawn. “How Companies Fund Retiree Medical Benefits.” Personnel Journal 72 
(November 1993): 78.
Harper, Robert M., Jr., William G. Mister, and Jerry R. Strawser. “The Effect of 
Recognition versus Disclosure of Unfunded Postretirement Benefits on Lenders’ 
Perceptions o f Debt.” Accounting Horizons 5 (September 1991): 50-56.
Henriques, D. “Double Whammy: FASB Readies a Blow to Corporate Earnings and 
Balance Sheets.” Barron’s, 17 April 1989, 8.
Hintze, Jerry L., " Number Cruncher Statistical System (NCSS) 5.X Series." Kaysville, 
Utah: February 1991.
Horrigan, James O. “A Short History of Financial Ratio Analysis.” The Accounting Review 
43 (April 1968): 284-94.
“How the Fortune 500 Are Dealing With FAS 106.” Financial Executive 8 (Jan-Feb 1992): 
24-25.
Khurana, Inder K., and Martha L. Loudder. “The Economic Consequences of SFAS 106 
in Rate-Regulated Enterprises.” The Accounting Review 69 (April 1994): 364-80.
Koretz, G. “Economic Trends: New Accounting Rules Could Batter the Balance Sheet.” 
Business Week, 23 November 1987, 26.
LaRock, Seymour. “Some Firms Bite Retiree Bullet, Others Delay Adopting Accounting 
Rule.” Employee Benefit Plan Review 46 (May 1992): 16-20.
________. “Adopting FAS 106 for Retiree Health Costs Reveals Some Unanticipated
Pitfalls.” Employee Benefit Plan Review 48 (August 1993): 10-12.
________. “Survey of FAS 106 Results Shows Little Rise in Retiree Health Care Expensed
in 1994.” Employee Benefit Plan Review 50 (November 1995): 40-42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
________. “The Real Beneficiaries of FAS 106.” Employee Benefit Plan Review 50
(December 1995): 6-7.
________. “Retiree Health Costs Continue Slide, According to Annual FAS 106 Survey.”
Employee Benefit Plan Review 52 (November 1997): 34-36.
Launer, Lee E., Barbara S. Bald, and Murray S. Akresh. "Analyzing the Health Benefits 
Promise." The CPA Journal 61 (January 1991): 18-25.
Lawson, Katherine. "Accounting for Retiree Health Care Benefits." Employee Benefit Plan 
Review 45 (December 1990): 18.
Leauby, Bruce Alan, Yusef Joseph Ugras, and Mary Jeanne Welsh. “Early SFAS 106 
Adopters Provide Revealing Healthcare Data.” Healthcare Financial Management 
47 (June 1993): 98.
Leauby, Bruce Alan, Yusef Joseph Ugras, and Mary Jeanne Welsh. “Postretirement Benefits 
Other than Pensions: The Effect of SFAS 106 Early Adoption. The Southern 
Business and Economic Journal 17 (October 1993): 50.
________. “Profile of Early Adopters: SFAS 106.” Mid-American Journal o f Business 10
(Spring 1995): 5-11.
Light, Larry, James B. Treece, and Lisa Driscoll. "Now That Wasn't So Bad, Was It?" 
Business Week, 2 December 1991, 123-24.
Lissy, William E. “Currents in Compensation and Benefits: Pensions and Postretirement 
Benefits: Most Companies Surveyed Have Estimated Their Financial Obligations 
Under FAS 106.” Compensation and Benefits Review 24 (July 1992): 18-19.
________. “Currents in Compensation and Benefits: Retirees’ Benefits: Many Firms Still
Undecided on How to Recognize Liability for Future Retireee Health Benefits.” 
Compensation and Benefits Review 25 (March 1993): 17.
Lissy, William E., and Marlene Morenstem. “Currents in Compensation and Benefits: 
Balancing Act for the ‘90s: Retirees Health Care.” Compensation and Benefits 
Review 25 (July 1993): 13-14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
128
McKenna, Joseph F. “Accounting for a Land Mine: FASB Aims at Post-Retirement Health 
Care.” Industry Week 17 (July 1989): 48-49.
McLendon, Robert G., Alex T. Arcady, and James S. Johnson. "OPEBs: FASB Prescribes 
Strong Medicine." The CPA Journal 62 (July 1992): 18-25.
Melbinger, Michael S., and Marianne W. Culver. “Excess Plan Assets Can Pay Retiree 
Benefits.” Taxation for Lawyers 20 (July 1991): 4.
Minitab, Inc., Minitab Statistical Software for Windows, Release 10 Xtra. 1995.
Mittelstaedt, H. Fred. “An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Underlying the Decision to 
Remove Excess Assets from Overfunded Pension Plans.” Journal o f Accounting and 
Economics 11 (November 1989): 399-418.
Mittelstaedt, H. Fred, and Phillip R. Regier. "The Market Response to Pension Plan 
Terminations." Accounting Review 68 (January 1993): 1-27.
Mittelstaedt, H. Fred, and Mark J. Warshawsky. “The Impact of Liabilities for Retiree 
Health Benefits on Share Prices.” The Journal o f Risk and Insurance 60 (March 
1993): 13-35.
Mittelstaedt, H Fred, William D. Nichols, and Philip R. Regier. “SFAS No. 106 and Benefit 
Reductions in Employer-Sponsored Retiree Health Care Plans.” Accounting Review 
70 (Oct 1995): 535-556.
Morgan, Charles C. “FAS 106 Triggers New Decisions On Retiree Funding.” Pension 
World 29 (June 1993): 13-14.
Morris, Frederic H. “What Should Be Done Now With Retiree Health Benefit Prefunding.” 
Employee Benefits Journal 18 (December 1993): 9.
Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information That investors Do Not Have.” Journal o f Financial 
Economics 13 (June 1984): 187-221.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
Myers, Stewart C. “The Capital Structure Puzzle.” The Journal o f Finance 39 (July 1984): 
575-92.
Nelson, Thomas G. “Post-Retirement Benefits: The Tip of a Financial Iceberg.” 
Management Accounting 68 (January 1987): 52-55.
Newell, Gale E. “Will Accrual Accounting Kill Retirees’ Healthcare Benefits?.” Personnel 
66 (September 1989): 52.
Norton, Curtis L. “Pension Accounting: Effects of Early Adoption.” The CPA Journal 58 
(March 1988): 46-51.
“Other Rules Offset FAS 106 Impact.” Employee Benefit Plan Review 52 (November
1997): 35.
Owings, Guy W., and Vicki Baier. “OPEB: Closing a Financial Reporting Gap.” The 
National Public Accountant 37 (April 1992): 34-38.
Page, Leigh. “Employers Look to Managed Care to Reign in Benefits Costs.” American 
Medical News, 19 February 1996, 5.
Parker, M. “Post-Retirement Care Crisis: Firms Try to Assess Impact of Proposal.” 
Pensions and Investment Age, 5 September 1988, 3.
Patterson, Martha Priddy. “Retirement Benefits in 1995: KPMG’s Third Annual Survey 
Findings.” Journal o f Compensation and Benefits 11 (Nov-Dee 1995): 15-22.
Peles, Yoram C., and Meir I. Schneller. “The Duration of the Adjustment Process of 
Financial Ratios.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 62 (November 1989): 
527-32.
Poe, Stephanie L. "Enrollment in Employer-Sponsored HMO/POS Plans Drops, While 
Health Plan Costs Jump 6.1%." Mercer USA Resource Center: News Releases 26 
January 1999. Website: http://www.wmmercer.com/usa/english/resource/
resource_news_topic40.html, 15 March 1999.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
“Providers Seek to Rein in Retiree Health Costs.” Modem Healthcare, 25 January 1993, 
36.
Randall, Robert F. "FASB Issues Controversial Proposal." Management Accounting 69 
(March 1989): 9.
“Regulatory Authority Denies Utility’s Request to Switch to FAS 106.” Employee Benefit 
Plan Review 47 (January 1993): 58.
Reimert, William A. “Accounting for Retiree Health Benefits.” Compensation and Benefits 
Review 23 (September 1991): 49-55.
Reisch, Marc S. “Companies Face Big Jump in Costs of Health Benefits for Retirees.” 
Chemical and Engineering News 70 (16 March 1992): 17-21.
“Retiree Benefits Continue to Drop Slowly, Survey Says.” Business and Health 10 
(November 1992): 30.
Ryan, Raymond B., and Richard L. Johnson. "Fund OPEB Now, Not Later." Financial 
Executive 8 (May 1992): 46-47.
Salisbury, D. “A Rude Awakening on Retiree Health Benefits.” Across the Board 24 
(October 1987): 8.
Schick, Frederick I. “Health Care After Retirement: The Costs of Retiree Benefits Has 
Risen.” The Personnel Administrator 34 (July 1989): 90.
Schwartz, Richard, and John M. Lorentz. “Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions.” 
The CPA Journal 56 (May 1986): 16-22.
Scott, Diana J. “Other Postretirement Benefits: What the FASB Heard in Comment Letters 
and Public Hearings.” In Status Report No. 206, 5-7. Stamford, Connecticut: 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, November 27, 1989.
Scott, Diana J., Jane B. Adams, and Joyce Ann Strawser. “Retiree Welfare Benefits Come 
Out of Hiding.” The CPA Journal 58 (November 1988): 26-34.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
131
Scott, Diana J., and Wayne S. Upton. “The Role of Cost-Benefit Considerations in the 
FASB’s Standards-Setting Process.” In Status Report No. 229, 6-14. Stamford, 
Connecticut: Financial Accounting Standards Board, February 28, 1992.
Securities and Exchange Commission. Edgar Database, http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm.
Senteney, David L., and Jerry R. Strawser. “An Investigation of the Association between 
Financial Statement Effects and Management’s Early Adoption of SFAS 87.” 
Review of Business and Economic Research 25 (Spring 1990): 12-22.
Simon, Robin B., and Karen Roller-Edelstein. “Postretirement Benefit Accounting: Survey 
Results and Implications.” Journal ofCompensation and Benefits 12 (July- August 
1996): 11-18.
Smith, Jack L. “Pensions and OPEBs: Accounting Similarities and Differences.” The CPA 
Journal 63 (April 1993): 52-57.
Smith, James A. “An Empirical Analysis of Management’s Choice of Alternatives in 
Adopting Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 106.” DBA 
diss., Louisiana Tech University, 1994.
Stone, Mary. “A Financing Explanation for Overfunded Pension Plan Terminations.” 
Journal o f Accounting Research 25 (Autumn 1987): 317-26.
Stone, Mary, and Robert W. Ingram. “The Effect of Statement No. 87 on the Financial 
Reports of Early Adopters.” Accounting Horizons 2 (September 1988): 48-61.
Strazewski, James Len. “Accounting Change Eroding Retiree Plans.” Crain’s Chicago 
Business, 25 November 1991, T2.
“Study Tracks Trends in Retiree Health Coverage—Examines Possible Impact of Medicare 
Reform.” Employee Benefit Plan Review 52 (November 1997): 38-39.
“The Market’s View of OPEB.” Financial Executive 5 (November 1989): 58.
Thomas, Jacob K. “Why Do Firms Terminate Their Overfunded Pension Plans?” Journal 
o f Accounting and Economics 11 (November 1989): 361-98.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
Thomas, Paula B. and Larry E. Farmer. "OPEB: Improved Reporting or the Last Straw?" 
Journal o f Accountancy 170 (November 1990): 102-12.
Van Remortel, Fred. “Retiree Health-Benefit Liability Reaches the Crisis Point.” Pension 
World 24 (August 1988): 47-48.
Warshawsky, Mark J., H. Fred Mittelstaedt, and Carrie Cristea. “Recognizing Retiree 
Health Benefits: The Effect of SFAS 106.” Financial Management 22 (Summer 
1993): 188-99.
Watts, Ross L., and Jerold L. Zimmerman. “T oward a Positive Theory of the Determination 
of Accounting Standards.” The Accounting Review 53 (January 1978): 112-34.
Watts, Ross L., and Jerold L. Zimmerman. “Positive Accounting Theory." New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1986.
Watts, Ross L., and Jerold L. Zimmerman. “Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year 
Perspective.” The Accounting Review 65 (January 1990): 131-56.
Wilson, Arlette C., and Atha Beard. “Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions—A 
Look at the New Rules.” The National Public Accountant 36 (November 1991): 36- 
40.
Wilson, Arlette C., and Kent T. Fields. “Part 2: How to Calculate Net Periodic OPEB 
Cost.” The Practical Accountant 24 (October 1991): 40-43.
Williams, Fred. “HMOs Cut Into FAS 106 Liabilities.” Pensions & Investments 23 (July
1995): 1-2.
Woolsey, Christine. “Employers Alter Retiree Benefits in Light of FAS 106.” Business 
Insurance, 4 May 1992, 2.
Wyatt, Arthur. “Commentary: OPEB Costs: The FASB Establishes Accountability.” 
A ccounting Horizons 4 (March 1990): 108-10.
Young, Na. “Stock Market Reaction to FASB No. 106: The Disclosure of Postretirement 
Benefits.” Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1993.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
